




# Annual Risk Analysis 2012







# Annual Risk Analysis 2012



Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. The Annual Risk Analysis and other risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



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Cover photo: Lesvos island coastline through a night vision device during JO Poseidon 2009 by Major Harri Tossavainen of the Finnish Border Guard; © Frontex 2010

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## Executive summary

The detections of illegal border-crossing along the external borders of EU Member States rose sharply from approximately 104 000 in 2009 and 2010 to nearly 141 000 in 2011 (+35%). The migrants crossing the borders illegally mainly came from Tunisia (20%), Afghanistan (16%) and Pakistan (11%).

This increase is mostly due to the fact that more than 64 000 detections were reported in the Central Mediterranean area, compared to only 5 000 in 2010. This surge was triggered by the change in the political regime in Tunisia and later sustained by the departure of many sub-Saharan migrants from Libya.

The second main area where illegal border-crossings were detected was the land border along the Eastern Mediterranean route, with over 55 000 detections, representing a 12% increase compared to last year. At this border section, the number of detections increased steadily throughout the year. In turn, migrants who illegally crossed the external border in Greece tended to transit through the Western Balkans, or travel directly from Greece to Italy.

While the land border between Greece and Albania used to be one of the main entry points of irregular migration, the detections of illegal border-crossing reported at this border section dropped considerably in 2011, from almost 35 300 to 5 270 (-85%). This decrease follows the introduction of a visa free regime for Albanians as of 21 December 2010. It coincides with an increase in refusals of entry to Albanians at the Greek land border with Albania, the Italian sea border, and at UK

air borders. Thus, Albanians ranked first in terms of refusals of entry issued in the EU as a whole, surpassing the number of Ukrainians refused entry.

Irregular migration pressure on the Western Mediterranean route is now higher than it was in 2010, with slightly less than 8 500 detections in 2011, which represented only 6% of the EU total. On this route, most of the migrants came from Algeria and Morocco, and the number of migrants from sub-Saharan countries increased.

The use of forged documents to enter the EU illegally continued to be of particular concern. The high level expertise needed to falsify modern documents means that false documents are increasingly linked to organised crime. The number of detections of travel document forgery used to enter the EU was close to 9 500 in 2011, the highest level since systematic data collection began in Frontex in 2009. Apart from this increase, there are increased abuses of authentic documents by unauthorised users, known as imposters.

Within the EU, the total number of detections of illegal stay remained stable between 2010 and 2011 at approximately 350 000. As in the case of the reported number of detections of illegal border-crossing, illegally staying Afghans and Tunisians also ranked among the top nationalities.

Looking ahead, the border between Greece and Turkey is very likely to remain one of the areas with the highest number of detections of illegal border-crossing along the external border. More and more mi-

grants are expected to take advantage of Turkish visa policies and the expansion of Turkish Airlines, carrying more passengers to more destinations, to transit through Turkish air borders and subsequently attempt to enter the EU illegally.

At the southern maritime borders large flows are most likely to develop on the Central Mediterranean route due to its proximity to Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, where political instability and the high unemployment rates are pushing people abroad and where there is evidence of facilitation networks also offering facilitation services to transiting migrants.

In response to increasingly sophisticated travel documents, there is an increase in the use of fraudulent supporting documents to obtain authentic travel documents. For example, facilitators are developing new techniques to circumvent biometric checks. This type of fraud not only enables illegal border-crossings but also affects internal security by allowing undocumented migrants to assume false identities. It is assumed that the number of detected document fraudsters increasingly under-represents the overall extent of the phenomenon, as the main focus at the national level is still on forged and counterfeit documents, rather than *modi operandi* involving false identities or impostors.

There is an increasing risk of political and humanitarian crises arising in third countries which may result in the displacement of large numbers of people in search of international protection towards the land and sea borders of the EU.

The persistently large number of annual detections of illegal border-crossing along the external borders, oscillating between 100 000 and 150 000 since 2008, has created a market for criminal organisations facilitating the movement of illegal stayers within the EU. There is an increasing risk that these secondary movements are adding to the pull factors for illegal crossings of the EU external borders.

Various austerity measures introduced throughout Member States may result in increasing disparities between Member States in their capacity to perform border controls and hence enable facilitators to select those border types and sections that are perceived as weaker in detecting specific *modi operandi*. Budget cuts could also exacerbate the problem of corruption, thus increasing the vulnerability to illegal activities across the external borders.

The increase in the number of air and land passengers and rising global mobility will increase the number of border checks. Visa liberalisation and local border-traffic agreements are also being increasingly implemented or planned. As a result, the responsibilities and workloads of border-control authorities are increasing.

As a corollary to strengthened surveillance and checks along the external borders, border-control authorities will be increasingly confronted with the detection of cross-border criminal activities, such as trafficking in human beings (THB), drug trafficking and the smuggling of excise goods, as well as cross-border crime committed on exit, such as the smuggling of stolen assets, particularly vehicles.



# 1. Introduction

The Frontex Annual Risk Analysis (ARA) 2012 has been developed to plan the coordination of operational activities at the external borders of the EU in 2013. The ARA combines an assessment of threats and vulnerabilities at the EU external borders with an assessment of their impacts and consequences to enable the Agency to effectively balance and prioritise the allocation of resources against identified risks.

Frontex operational activities aim to strengthen border security by ensuring the coordination of Member States' actions in the implementation of Community measures relating to the management of the external borders. The coordination of operational activities also contributes to better allocation of Member States' resources and protection of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The ARA 2012 concentrates on the current scope of Frontex operational activities, which is focussed on irregular migration

at the external borders of the EU and the Schengen Associated Countries. Central to the concept of integrated border management, border management should also cover security threats present at the external borders. Hence, a section is devoted to the phenomenon of THB, the combating of which was tasked to Frontex pursuant to the EU action plan (2005/C 311/01) on best practices, standards and procedures for combating and preventing THB.

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express its gratitude to all members of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network in Member States for their efforts in providing data and information, as well as Europol, which has contributed to the ARA 2012, and all Frontex colleagues involved in the preparation of the report.



## 2. Methodology

### Data collection plan

The backbone of the ARA 2012 are the monthly statistics provided by Member States within the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN). This regular data collection exercise was launched in September 2007 and refined in 2008. Thanks to the FRAN members' efforts, a much larger statistical coverage was achieved in 2009, focussing on six key indicators of irregular migration: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing, (2) refusals of entry, (3) detections of illegal stay, (4) asylum applications, (5) detections of facilitators, and (6) detections of forged documents.

Following the closing of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI) working group in April 2010, most of its mandates, in particular those concerning the exchange of data were transferred to FRAN. Most indicators monitored by CIREFI had already been part of the monthly data exchange among FRAN members and only the statistics on returns had to be added as the seventh indicator of the regular data collection as of January 2011.

The returns of third-country nationals illegally entering or staying in Member States are an essential counter-measure undertaken to control irregular migration. Return of third-country nationals to their country of origin is, to some extent, considered a measure of last resort in that it is only undertaken after other migration policy measures have failed and under circumstances where prior migration controls have proved ineffective or where resources

have been overstretched. Moreover, experience has shown that efforts of Member States to return irregular migrants can be directly conducive to discouraging future migrant flows into and inside the EU.

For this analysis, only returns to third countries were considered, as opposed to those taking place between Member States. For this reason, the data may differ from the data released by Member States, as they often include returns between Member States.

Bi-monthly analytical reports and incident reports of Member States routinely collected within the FRAN and Member States' contributions to several Tailored Risk Analyses produced in 2011 were both important sources of information, especially as regards the analysis of routes and *modi operandi*.

Open sources of information were also effectively exploited, especially in identifying the main push and pull factors for irregular migration to the EU. Among others, these sources included reports issued by government agencies, international or non-governmental organisations, as well as official EU reports, such as the Commission's reports on third countries, and mainstream news agencies.

In addition, Frontex organised an Annual Analytical Review to consolidate the risk analyses presented in the FRAN Quarterly for 2011, and also to gather knowledge on likely risks of irregular migration expected in 2012 and 2013 at the EU external borders. Participants of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network were invited in Febru-



ary 2012 to identify risks at the external borders during a one-day exercise, based on terms of reference and questions distributed in December 2011. After this exercise, the participants were given one week to consult with colleagues at the national level to provide additional comments and rank the risks identified.

Data were collected by Frontex from national border-control authorities categorised by border type (land, air and sea) and from land borders categorised by border section with neighbouring third countries.

The data collected by the FRAN are compiled and analysed on a quarterly basis. Member States' data that are processed by Frontex are not treated as official statistics, and thus may occasionally vary from data officially published by national authorities.

Throughout 2011, some FRAN members performed backdated updates of their 2010 statistics. These updates have been accounted for in this document and so some data presented here may differ from the data presented in the 2011 Annual Risk Analysis.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay, and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and the Schengen Associated

Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

In turn, Europol contributed to the ARA 2012 by providing information on facilitated irregular migration.

#### Quality of available data

Consistent with other law-enforcement indicators, variation in administrative data related to border control depends on several factors. In this case, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry are both functions of the amount of effort spent detecting migrants and the flow of irregular migrants to the EU. For example, increased detections of illegal border-crossing might be due to an actual increase in the flow of irregular migrants, or they may in fact be an outcome of more resources made available to detect migrants. In exceptional cases, an influx of resources may produce an increase in reported detections while effectively masking the actual decrease in the flow of migrants, resulting from a strong deterrent effect.

Conservative estimates of the number of irregular migrants within the EU vary between three and six million, according to the latest results of *Clandestino*, an EU-sponsored project implemented by the ICMPD.\* However, other estimates put the figure of irregular migrants at eight million, of which 80% are staying inside the Schengen area, half of which having originally entered it legally. However, there is currently no estimate of the annual flow of irregular migrants crossing the border illegally.

\* The International Centre for Migration Policy Development is an international organisation operating in Europe, Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East.

Information on national-level resources for border-control authorities and their allocation is currently only partially known. These data are provided by Member States themselves either within the Schengen evaluation mechanism or within the External Borders Fund reporting. Without systematic and reliable information on resources allocated to border control and without estimates of irregular migration flows, it is not possible to assess the performance and impact of the border controls put in place, and the analyses of the situation at the EU external borders are limited to descriptive statistics of the administrative data provided by Member States.

As highlighted in the Schengen Catalogue, variation in regular passenger flow is an important factor to be taken into account in the allocation of border-control resources. However, regular flows of passengers across the EU external borders are currently not recorded systematically. Some approximations were arrived at by using available Eurostat data on passenger flows at the air borders, and relying on publicly available data from national border-control authorities for passenger flows at the land borders.

Data on the number of EU visas issued and their places of issue would improve the characterisation of third-country passenger flows. However, this information, which is collected within the Council Visa Working Party, is not yet available for 2011. For

the purpose of the ARA, data from 2008 to 2010 are discussed as an introduction to the general situation at the borders.

#### **Application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)**

A key development in the CIRAM update released in 2011 is the adoption of a management approach to risk analysis that defines risk as a function of threat, vulnerability and impact. Such an approach endeavours to reflect the spirit of the Schengen Borders Code and the Frontex Regulation, both of which emphasise risk analysis as a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources within constraints of budget, staff and efficiency of equipment.

According to the model, a 'threat' is a force or pressure acting upon the external borders that is characterised by both its magnitude and likelihood; 'vulnerability' is defined as the capacity of a system to mitigate the threat and 'impact' is determined as the potential consequences of the threat. In this way, the structured and systematic breakdown of risk presented as conclusion, provides for an assessment of the relative overall risks posed by different threats as a function of the relevant vulnerabilities and impacts, and therefore will be of much use to decision-makers in setting priorities, in formulating counter-measures and in designating operational targets.



Table 1

**Summary of FRAN indicators**

As reported by Member States

<b>FRAN indicator</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>% change on previous year</b>
Illegal entries between BCPs	159 881	104 599	104 051	140 980	35
Clandestine entries at BCPs	:	296	242	282	17
Facilitators	9 884	9 171	8 629	6 957	-19
Illegal stay	441 237	412 125	353 077	350 944	-0.6
Refusals of entry*	121 294	113 029	108 651	118 087	8.7
Asylum applications**	223 173	219 814	203 880	254 054	25
False travel-document users	:	8 094	9 567	9 682	1.2
Return decisions issued***	:	:	:	231 276	<i>n.a.</i>
Effective returns	:	:	:	148 853	<i>n.a.</i>

Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2012

\* In addition, Spain reported refusals of entry in Ceuta and Melilla, which totalled 492 742 in 2008, 374 845 in 2009, 280 625 in 2010 and 215 021 in 2011.

\*\* For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications.

\*\*\* Decisions not available for France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.

## 3. Situation at the external borders

### 3.1. Border controls (visas and passenger flows)

#### Visa

The Community Code on Visas, which entered into force in April 2010, sets out the common requirements for issuing transit and short-term visas to enter the territory of Member States.\* There are currently over 100 nationalities that require a visa to enter the EU, covering more than 80% of non-EU population of the world. About one billion nationals from approximately 40 third countries do not require an EU visa. As indicated in the Visa Code, statistical data are an important means of monitoring migratory movements and can serve as an efficient management tool.\*\*

Generally, a short-stay visa issued by one of the Schengen States (visa C) entitles its holder to travel throughout the 26 Schengen States for up to three months within a six-month period. Visas for visits exceeding that period remain subject to national procedures. Data for 2011 are not yet available, but the Commission, through its DG Home Affairs has released the data for 2010, which showed that slightly more than 11.8 million visas (all types) have been issued by Schengen and non-Schengen Member States (Bulgaria, Romania, yet not the UK or Ireland). This represented an increase of about 16% compared to the previous year.

In 2010, as it has been the case since 2007, most short-stay visas were issued in the Russian Federation (4 466 253), where the number increased by 28% between 2009 and 2010. Ukraine followed with slightly more than one million visas issued in 2010

(+18% compared to 2009). China, in the third place with 784 000, saw the number of visas issued rising by 40% between 2009 and 2010.

The number of issued short-stay visas (visa C) varied across Member States, from 1.77 million issued by France to 549 issued by Iceland. The visa rejection rate, calculated as the ratio of the number of not-issued visas to the total number of applications, also varied, from 19% in Belgium (40 017 rejections for 215 978 applications) to 1% in Bulgaria (6 249 rejections for 599 026 applications).

#### Passenger flow

Passenger flow is an indicator of the volume of checks that border guards have to perform. Citizens enjoying free movement are subject to minimum checks, while third-country nationals, whether they require visas or not, will be subject to more thorough checks, as defined by the Schengen Borders Code. Hence, the nature and extent of passenger flow are important for planning resources for border checks.

At the European level there is no estimate of total passenger flows through the EU external borders. However, a one-week counting exercise conducted by the Council in 2009 (excluding the UK and Ireland) leads to two main conclusions: (1) EU citizens account for 72% of regular flow, and (2) land and air border flows are much larger than flows through maritime borders.

At the external land borders of the EU, although there is not systematic collection of passenger flow data at the EU level, the

\* Except for the UK and Ireland

\*\* Regulation (EC) 810/2009 (Visa Code), Point 19 of recitals



busiest border section for entries of passengers is probably the border between Slovenia and Croatia, with approximately 23 million annual entries. The land border between Spain and Morocco is also a very busy border section, totalling more than 10 million annual entries (for both Ceuta and Melilla). The land border between Poland and Ukraine, with approximately seven million passengers annually, also belongs to the busiest land border sections.

Along the eastern land border, stretching for more than 4 000 km from Romania to Finland, one recurring pattern is the strong seasonality of regular passenger flow, with most of the crossings (entry/exit) taking place during the summer months. This requires an optimal mobilisation of resources during this period to avoid undue waiting time for bona fide travellers. This is also the case at the Greek and Bulgarian land borders with Turkey. By contrast, the summer increase in passenger flow is smaller at the Slovenian border with Croatia.

At the air borders, Eurostat reported a total of 107 million arrivals on flights originating outside the EU in 2010, which was an increase by 10% compared to 2009. The largest numbers of arrivals are reported from the airport of London Heathrow with approximately 17 million passengers each year, followed by Paris-Charles De Gaulle airport (13 million) and Frankfurt airport (11 million). Other EU airports reported less than 10 million arrivals in 2010.

For 2011, according to a preliminary report issued by Eurostat in October 2011\*, the level of air passenger flow confirms the overall upward trend observed in 2010. Particularly remarkable is the growth of air passenger flow in Estonia (+37%) and Luxembourg (+25%). The decline observed in total air passenger flow was most pronounced for Greece (-14% between 2010

and 2011 for the first quarter of the year), especially marked by the effect of the crisis. Outside the EU-27, Turkey reported a remarkable increase of 26% in passenger flow.

### 3.2. Irregular migration

There were major and extensive developments in irregular migration pressure at the external border of the EU in 2011, resulting, on the one hand, from the increase in detections of illegal border-crossing in the Mediterranean following the situation in North Africa and, on the other, from the decrease in detections of Albanians illegally crossing the green border with Greece following the visa liberalisation.

At the EU level, the total number of detections of illegal border-crossing increased from 104 000 in 2010 to 141 000 in 2011 (+35%). The migration pressure at the external border increased even more than EU-level figures suggest, as they were offset by extensive reductions in Albanian circular migration.

Consistent with recent trends, the majority of detections were made in two hotspots of irregular migration, namely the Central Mediterranean area and the Eastern Mediterranean area accounting for 46% and 40% of the EU total, respectively, with additional effects detectable across Member States.

Most reported detections of illegal border-crossing involved Tunisians (28 829 detections) arriving by the Central Mediterranean route at the beginning of 2011. Afghans ranked second with just under 23 000 detections, mostly reported on the Eastern Mediterranean route. Detections of Pakistanis increased significantly and steadily throughout 2011, from less than 4 000 in 2010 to more than 15 300 in 2011, mostly on the Eastern Mediterranean route.

\* [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics\\_explained/index.php/Air\\_passenger\\_transport\\_-\\_monthly\\_statistics](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Air_passenger_transport_-_monthly_statistics)



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Detections of illegal stay remained relatively stable between 2010 (353 100) and 2011 (350 900), the majority of which were reported in the same three Member States as in previous years, i.e. Spain, France and Italy, together accounting for 36% of all detections. However, detections of illegal stay significantly increased in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. In these three Member States, the most detected nationality were Afghans, rising from approximately 4 300 detections in 2010 to more than 7 300 in 2011. Most of them had illegally crossed the border on the Eastern Mediterranean route. Detections of illegal stay significantly decreased in Greece, mostly due to fewer detections of illegally staying Albanians after visa liberalisation was introduced for this nationality.

In contrast to the increase in detections of illegal border-crossing and the stable detections of illegal stay, there were fewer detections of facilitators of irregular migration than ever before, totalling below 7 000. Much of the decline was due to a lower number of detected facilitators reported in Italy in 2011 in comparison to 2010. Detections of facilitators also decreased in Greece, corresponding to the decrease in facilitation required for illegal border-crossing along the border with Albania, as well as more stringent sanctions against facilitators. By contrast, detections of facilitators increased in France, mostly due to larger detections of Tunisian facilitators in the wake of the large flow of migrants arriving by the Central Mediterranean route,

and also in Switzerland. In the latter country the increase in detections of facilitators, corresponded to a two-fold increase in detections of illegal stay.

As regards effective returns to third countries, in 2011, Member States reported a total of slightly above 148 000 returned migrants. The comparison with previous year is not available due to limited reporting in 2010. The UK reported most of the effective returns, followed by Greece. Most of the migrants returned to third countries were Albanians. They were followed by Tunisians, mostly returned by Italy and France (7 800 in total for the two Member States).

Due to the difficulties in implementing the return agreement with Turkey, most of the orders to return migrants who had illegally crossed the border with Turkey could not be implemented. For example, there were a total of 21 542 return orders issued for Afghans in Greece, but only 745 effective returns.

### 3.2.1. Irregular migration routes

Following the waves of illegal border-crossing from North Africa in the first half of 2011, the Central Mediterranean route recorded the largest number of detections. As illustrated in Table 2 overleaf, the second greatest number of illegal border-crossings was reported on the Eastern Mediterranean route, where detections were more sustained through the year than on



Table 2

**Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported by routes and top three nationalities at the external borders

<b>Routes</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>Share of total</b>	<b>% change on previous year</b>
<b>Central Mediterranean Route</b>	<b>11 043</b>	<b>4 450</b>	<b>64 261</b>	46	1 344
Tunisia	1 624	652	27 982		4 192
Nigeria	1 655	1	6 078		607 700
Not specified	1	0	5 436		n.a.
Central Africa	0	0	3 703		n.a.
<b>Eastern Mediterranean route</b>	<b>39 975</b>	<b>55 688</b>	<b>57 025</b>	40	2.4
<b>Land</b>	<b>11 127</b>	<b>49 513</b>	<b>55 558</b>		12
Afghanistan	639	21 389	19 308		-9.7
Pakistan	1 224	3 558	13 130		269
Bangladesh	292	1 496	3 541		137
<b>Sea</b>	<b>28 848</b>	<b>6 175</b>	<b>1 467</b>		-76
Afghanistan	11 758	1 373	310		-77
Pakistan	257	148	179		21
Morocco	87	107	149		39
<b>Western Mediterranean Route</b>	<b>6 642</b>	<b>5 003</b>	<b>8 448</b>	6	69
<b>Sea</b>	<b>5 003</b>	<b>3 436</b>	<b>5 103</b>		49
Algeria	3 190	1 242	1 037		-17
Morocco	254	300	775		158
Côte d'Ivoire	85	122	466		282
<b>Land</b>	<b>1 639</b>	<b>1 567</b>	<b>3 345</b>		113
Not specified	503	1 108	2 610		136
Algeria	464	459	735		60
Morocco	672	0	0		n.a.
<b>Circular route from Albania to Greece</b>	<b>40 250</b>	<b>35 297</b>	<b>5 269</b>	3.7	-85
Albania	38 017	32 451	5 022		-85
Serbia	48	39	46		18
Pakistan	21	68	44		-35
<b>Western Balkan Route</b>	<b>3 089</b>	<b>2 371</b>	<b>4 646</b>	3.3	96
Afghanistan	700	469	981		109
Serbia	1 683	687	833		21
Pakistan	10	39	606		1 454
<b>Eastern borders Route</b>	<b>1 335</b>	<b>1 043</b>	<b>990</b>	0.7	-5.1
Moldova	396	393	250		-36
Georgia	173	144	209		45
Somalia	64	48	120		150
<b>Western African Route</b>	<b>2 244</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>340</b>	0.2	73
Morocco	176	179	321		79
Senegal	186	2	4		100
Guinea	304	0	4		n.a.
<b>Other</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>		-67
<b>Total</b>	<b>104 599</b>	<b>104 051</b>	<b>140 980</b>		<b>35</b>

Source: FRAN data received as of 10 February 2012



the Central Mediterranean route. Circular migration between Albania and Greece considerably reduced, while the Western Mediterranean route showed signs of increase in the second half of 2011. Along the eastern land borders, detections of illegal border-crossing were low. Figure 1 presents a statistical overview of the detections of illegal border-crossing by route and quarter.


### Central Mediterranean route

In the Central Mediterranean area, Member States reported a total of 64 000 detections, compared to only 5 000 in 2010. Most of the illegal border-crossings occurred between February and August 2011, which represented one of the largest numbers of detections in a single area over such

a short period of time (seven months). By comparison, detections in the same area for the whole of 2008, the previous peak year, totalled less than 50 000.

Initially, detections in the Central Mediterranean massively increased in early 2011, due to civil unrest erupting in the region, particularly in Tunisia, Libya and, to a lesser extent, Egypt. As a result, between January and March some 20 000 Tunisian migrants arrived on the Italian island of Lampedusa. In the second quarter of 2011 the flow of Tunisian migrants was reduced by 75% following an accelerated repatriation agreement that was signed between Italy and Tunisia. However, large numbers of sub-Saharan migrants were detected in Lampedusa, Sicily and Malta, many having been forcibly expelled from Libya by the Gaddafi re-

Figure 1 Detections of illegal border-crossing by route and by quarter



Source: FRAN data received as of 10 February 2012



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Figure 2: **North African migrants detected at sea during JO Hermes 2011**

gime. Since October 2011, the situation has eased somewhat due to democratic elections in Tunisia and the National Transitional Council successfully gaining control of Libya. However, the situation remains of concern, with sporadic arrivals from Tunisia now adding to arrivals from Egypt. There are also some concerns that the flow from Libya may resume.

The flows of migrants arriving in the EU have had an effect on the number of applications for international protection. At the EU level, the number of Tunisians detected illegally crossing the border totalled nearly 29 000 in 2011 (see Fig. 2), whereas the number of applications for international protection reported through the Frontex Risk Analysis Network was 7 100. The flow of Tunisian migrants who crossed the border illegally appeared to be mostly economically-driven, with most migrants heading to France as their final destination.

The large number of detections of Tunisians crossing the external border illegally in 2011 was matched by a significant increase in detections of illegally staying Tunisians over the last year. Such detections increased from under 8 500 in 2010 to more than 22 500 in 2011, with Tunisian illegal stayers mostly reported in France.

In 2011, approximately 8 600 Tunisians were returned (this number does not include returns within the EU), mostly by Italy and France.

#### **Eastern Mediterranean route**

Detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route (57 000) have followed a remarkably seasonal pattern, invariably peaking in the third quarter of each year and concentrated at the Greek border with Turkey with a shift from the sea border to the land border in early 2010. The five most commonly detected




Figure 3: Main areas of detections of illegal border-crossing in 2011



nationalities were from Asia (Afghan, Pakistani, Bangladeshi) and North Africa (Algerian and Moroccan).

The most commonly detected migrants were Afghans, who were the second most represented nationality detected crossing the external border illegally in 2011, representing 16% of the EU total. Information collected during interviews conducted during JO Poseidon Land 2011 suggests that more than 60% of Afghan migrants apprehended in Greece were actually residing (either legally or illegally) as refugees in Iran prior to their attempt to enter the EU.

At this border section detections of migrants from Pakistan increased massively compared to the previous year and ranked third in the EU total with 15 377 detections. Intelligence suggests that most Pakistani migrants are young male and previously unemployed economic migrants from northeastern Pakistan. They travel overland to Greece often with the help of facilitators and are holding false documentation. The main destinations claimed by the Pakistani migrants who were interviewed were Greece, followed by Germany, Belgium, Italy, the UK and France.

Small numbers of nationals claiming to be from Iraq, Turkey, Palestine and Syria attempted to enter Bulgaria illegally, but no significant displacement in the irregular migratory flow towards the Bulgarian-Turkish land border was observed.

Detections at the sea border between Greece and Turkey have declined significantly in the last two years. The decline at this previous hotspot is confirmed by data collected during JO Poseidon Sea but stands in contrast to the significant number of illegal border-crossings detected at the land border between Greece and Turkey, the associated increase in illegal border-

crossings across the southern Italian blue border, and the attempts of clandestine entry on ferries arriving in southern Italy from Greece.

Undeniably, the land border between Greece and Turkey is now an established illegal-entry point for irregular migrants and facilitation networks. Secondary movements from this hotspot of migration are readily detected at the land borders between the Western Balkans and both Slovenia and Hungary, at the blue border of southern Italy and at a range of European airports, particularly in final destination countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. Secondary movements can thus be classified into two categories: secondary movements affecting other sections of the external border, namely the Western Balkans, and secondary movements affecting flows of migrants illegally staying in the EU (intra-EU).

Secondary movements through the Western Balkans are discussed in a dedicated section below. As regards intra-EU movements many migrants transit through Greece via the intra-Schengen air border using fraudulent documents. They mainly use French or Greek ID-cards or passports encompassing a wide range of fraud: forged (photo substitution), counterfeit and genuine documents (imposters). Small EU airports are often targeted, either as departure or arrival points, for example from Athens to Brussels South Charleroi in Belgium, or Thessaloniki and Heraklion in Greece to German destinations. In Germany, a large proportion of asylum applications were filed by passengers on intra-Schengen flights arrived from Greek airports.



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### **Circular migration from Albania to Greece**

Since being granted visa-free travel to the EU in late 2010, Albanians have been detected crossing the border illegally in much lower numbers. However, reports suggest that Albanians are still circular migrants to Greece, but this legal flow is now routed through land BCPs. In support of this, Albanians are now refused entry to Greece in large numbers, mostly due to an existing alert in the Visa Information System. It is assumed that in many cases, the alerts have been created following a previous attempt, before visa liberalisation, to cross the border illegally. In addition, other movements are now reflected in refusals of entry to Italy and Slovenia.

The reduction in illegal border-crossings has allowed Albanian border-control authorities to refocus some of their surveillance efforts on other cross-border criminal activities, resulting in significantly increased cannabis seizures.

The broadening of legal travel options has reduced substantially the number of detected Albanians staying illegally in Greece. By contrast, detections of Albanians illegally staying increased in several other Member States such as France, the UK, Belgium, Germany and Sweden.

### **Western Mediterranean route (sea, Ceuta and Melilla)**

Irregular migration across the Western Mediterranean towards southern Spain was at a low level through most of 2010. However, pressure has been steadily in-

creasing throughout 2011 to reach almost 8 500 detections, or 6% of the EU total. A wide range of migrants from North African and sub-Saharan countries were increasingly detected in this region. It is difficult to analyse the exact composition of the flow, as the number of migrants of unknown nationality on this route doubled compared to the previous quarter. This may indicate an increasing proportion of nationalities that are of very similar ethnicity and/or geographic origin.

The most common and increasingly detected were migrants of unknown nationality, followed by migrants local to the region, coming from Algeria and Morocco. There were also significant increases in migrants departing from further afield, namely countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria and Congo.

In 2011, two boats were intercepted in the waters of the Balearic Islands with Algerians on board, having departed from the village of Dellys (Algeria) near Algiers. However, most migrants prefer to target the southern coast of the Iberian Peninsula.

### **Western African route**

The cooperation between Spain and key western African countries (Mauritania, Senegal and Mali), including bilateral agreements, is developing. They are one of the main reasons for the decrease in arrivals on the Western African route over the last years, as is the presence of patrolling assets near the African coast. Despite a slight increase at the end of 2010, detections on this route remained low in 2011, almost exclusively involving Moroccan migrants.



In January 2011 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime published a report on the role of organised crime groups in facilitating irregular migration from West Africa to the EU. The report was generated by desk and field research (interviews) and concludes with four main findings, which are consistent with the findings of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network:

1. West Africans are facilitated by loose networks with no permanent structure;
2. Within West Africa, freedom of movement gives little incentive to engage in smuggling of migrants;
3. In West Africa, most smugglers are migrants themselves, passing on their own experiences;
4. In some West African countries, important social value is attached to those who decide to leave and also to those who have successfully made it to Europe, be it legally or illegally, even though their situation in Europe is often worse than it was at home.

#### **Western Balkan route**

Apart from Albanian circular migration, the Western Balkans route remained largely a function of the transiting flow of migrants that enter the EU at the Greek-Turkish borders and later continue towards other Member States through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia. Migrants travelling within the EU from Greece and further on to other destination Member States usually use the fastest possible route to re-enter the Schengen area (Hungary or Slovenia).

The Slovenian authorities reported an increase in detections of Afghans and Pakistanis who, having claimed asylum in Croatia, tried to illegally enter the EU. The increase was significant enough for the Slovenian Ministry of Interior to issue a

public warning calling upon citizens to report sightings of irregular migrants.

In 2011, detections at the Romanian border with Serbia surpassed those at the Slovenian border with Croatia. Migrants were mostly detected close to the border area between Serbia, Romania and Hungary, which should be considered as a displacement from the main Serbian-Hungarian route, where additional measures by Serbian and Hungarian authorities made it more difficult to cross the border illegally.

Consistent with detections at the land border between Greece and Turkey, the most detected nationalities were Afghan and Pakistani. Arabic-speaking migrants were also detected in large numbers.

With more than 21 000 asylum applications submitted in 2011 in the EU, the asylum abuse by the five visa-exempt nationalities of the Western Balkans, mostly nationals of Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, remained a significant problem in 2011. However, compared to 2010, the lower number of applications filed in 2011 is a sign of a decreasing trend of this phenomenon.

#### **Eastern European route**

The route running through eastern land borders is reflected in detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Finland and Latvia. Despite the length of the total border section, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing tends to be lower than on other routes, totalling approximately 1 000 detections in 2011.

Reports from Belarus and EU Member States suggest that there are increasing numbers of migrants from Georgia arriving in Belarus




Figure 4: Main areas of refusals of entry in 2011



with the intention of illegally entering the EU. Many arrived by air but others were detected transiting Ukraine and Armenia. This migration flow is also reflected by increased presence of Georgians in migration indicators in several Member States such as illegal border-crossing (Poland, Lithuania), secondary movements (Estonia) and applications for asylum (Latvia, Poland).

Also relevant for the Baltic area in 2011, particularly Latvia and Estonia, are reports of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan countries being increasingly detected. For example, there was a growing number of migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo detected in Latvia and heading for Finland as their destination country. These migrants first travelled to the Russian Federation by air and later tried to enter the EU using falsified documents, often Belgian residence permits.

#### Air routes

In 2011, the external air borders of the EU continued to be characterised by large passenger flows, a large share of refusals of entry and a substantial number of detections of forged documents. As regards border controls, the most significant increases were observed in refusals of entry to Albanian nationals following visa liberalisation at the end of 2010, and an almost 20% rise in applications for asylum made directly at the air border in relation to the previous year.

Refusals of entry at the air borders remained stable at about 49 000. Brazilians still ranked first on this indicator, even though their number has been decreasing since 2008, totalling 4 700 refusals in 2011, compared to 6 000 in 2010. Albanians became the second most often refused nationality, jumping from 624 refusals of entry in 2010 to slightly more than 3 300 in 2011. Albanians were mostly refused entry

at Italian and Belgian airports, for the reason of an alert in the Schengen Information System or in national register (representing 40% of the cases at Italian airports), or for not possessing enough documentation justifying the purpose of stay. The map on the next page (see Fig. 4) shows the areas along the external borders reporting the largest number of refusals of entry.

Compared to 2010, applications for asylum filed at the air borders in 2011 increased by almost 20% to reach approximately 12 000, or 5% of the EU total. Similarly to the previous year, most of the applications were filed by Iranians and Afghans. The most conspicuous increase in 2011 was reported for applications filed by Syrians, which totalled over 700 compared to under 300 in 2010.

#### 3.2.2. *Modus operandi*

##### Illegal border-crossing of the land borders

The main characteristic in this *modus operandi* is for migrants to cross on foot in small groups, usually at night. Increasingly, the facilitators would not cross the border themselves but leave the migrants close to the border with instructions on how to cross and how to behave and continue their journey once on the other side of the border.

There were several reports indicating that migrants would take advantage of the change of border guards' shifts to attempt crossing the border. However, there is no systematic data collection in place confirming these reports.

Information collected during Frontex Joint Operations suggests that migrants travel to the Greek-Turkish land border in order to cross the River Evros at night in small groups. They use small-size inflatable boats propelled by oars.



The geographical analysis of data collected during Frontex Joint Operations confirmed that the illegal crossing usually took place relatively close to the road networks on the two sides of the border. On the third-country side, the road connection enabled facilitators to easily drop off migrants at a minimum cost and time, while on the Member State side, the proximity of a road allowed migrants to continue their journey further into the EU on their own or be easily picked up by facilitators.

Individual land border-crossings were rare. The size of groups varied from a few individuals to large groups of about 50 (and more in exceptional cases). Detections usually took place right after the crossing. In general, migrants did not attempt to escape or avoid apprehension.

There is no data or estimates of the number of migrants crossing the green border undetected, but it is assumed to be rather low.

#### **Travelling undocumented and false statement of nationality as part of overall *modus operandi***

Many migrants opt to cross the green or blue border undocumented, so as to make it more difficult to determine their actual country of origin. Similarly, false statements about their nationality can also be considered as part of the *modus operandi* of illegal border-crossing. This is particularly the case for migrants from those third countries with which readmission agreements exist and are implemented.

#### **Applying for asylum as part of overall *modus operandi***

Several Member States reported cases of migrants who had entered the EU illegally, attempting to reach their final destination, often in a western European Member State,

and claiming asylum only if apprehended by border guards or other law-enforcement authorities.

Some Member States reported that once they had registered in an asylum centre, many migrants absconded only a few days later, continuing their journey to their intended final destination. This was particularly the case for Serbians and Afghans detected at the border between Hungary and Serbia.

#### **Illegal border-crossing of the blue border**

In 2011, most of the migrants illegally crossing the external borders in the Mediterranean Sea were detected on Tunisian wooden fishing boats, but migrants are diversifying their methods, as illustrated by the wide variety of vessels detected in 2011 during Frontex Joint Operations.

One detected group of migrants paid EUR 2 000 to buy a 4 m traditional fishing boat equipped with fuel, cigarettes, bread and water, and a 15 hp outboard engine (see Fig. 5). They left Skhira in Tunisia paying a local skipper to tow them to open waters. They were given a compass and a GPS device and were cut loose after three to four hours.



Figure 5: Irregular migrants from Tunisia



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Figure 6: **Boat carrying migrants forced to leave Libya**



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Figure 8: **Three Moroccan migrants preparing to swim to Ceuta**



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Figure 7: **Small inflatable craft used for illegal border-crossing between Morocco and Gibraltar**



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Figure 9: **Pleasure boats are used for secondary movements from Greece to Italy**

In April 2011 a 22 m vessel departed from Libya and was detected near Lampedusa carrying some 760 migrants mostly nationals of North and Central African countries. Intelligence suggests that such migrants had generally been residents of Libya for up to a year before being forcibly expelled in this way (see Fig. 6).

Some migrants use toy inflatable boats, often with no engine to get to Spain across the Strait of Gibraltar (see Fig. 7). Those small and unstable boats usually carry two or three people (in case of Moroccan would-be migrants) but in the case of sub-Saharan migrants they have been detected carrying up to ten people. For instance, as many as 32 sub-Saharan migrants were rescued near Melilla onboard four toy inflatable boats on the early morning of 29 June 2011. They had left the Moroccan coast (Tres Forcas

Cape area) for a short trip to Spanish waters of north of Melilla. This *modus operandi* appears to be replacing that of departing from Tres Forcas Cape hidden in Moroccan fishing boats and then jumping off the vessel to reach the Spanish shore swimming.

In the case of Ceuta, local geographical features even allow for swimming as a method of illegal entry (see Fig. 8).

A 13 m sailing boat registered in the Port of Piraeus (Greece) was detected in Puglia (Italy) carrying 35 irregular migrants. Apart from speed boats, such high quality pleasure boats are typically used for secondary movements from Greece to Italy. They are also used for a direct crossing from Turkey to Greece (see Fig. 9).

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Figure 10: **Boat with Algerian migrants on route to the Spanish coast**

In one case detected on 17 June 2011, a small (5 m) fibreglass boat was intercepted in the waters of the Balearic Islands with 11 Algerians onboard. It had departed from the village of Dellys (Algeria) near Algiers. This was the second boat carrying migrants detected in 2011 in the waters of the isle of Mallorca (the first one was intercepted in January). However, reports from multiple sources suggest that migrants are increasingly using unseaworthy vessels to attempt the crossing from Morocco to both the Spanish mainland and the cities of Melilla and Ceuta (see Fig. 10).

#### **Clandestine migrants hiding in vehicles**

Compared to detections of illegal border-crossing, detections of clandestine entry at external EU borders are very low (242 detections in 2011), but cases detected at internal EU borders suggest that the actual number of clandestine entries at the external border may be much higher. For example, within the EU there were 1 407 detections in 2011.

In 2011 several detections of clandestine migrants hidden in lorries transporting goods from Turkey or Greece to (other) EU countries were made in Romania on exit at the border with Hungary. In one case 36 clandestine migrants were detected

(31 Afghans, four Pakistanis, one Iranian) hidden in a lorry transporting engine oil from Greece to Germany, 15 of them in possession of Greek asylum documents. They had been placed in the lorry in Bulgaria by the facilitators who had previously helped them to cross the border between Greece and Bulgaria. In another case eight migrants were discovered (six Syrians, one Iraqi, one Turk) hidden in a lorry transporting cables from Turkey to Slovakia. After detection, the six Syrian nationals claimed to be Palestinians.

In 2011 there was an increase in detections of stowaways in the Spanish Port of Málaga, where there is a significant flow of goods and passengers from Ceuta and Melilla. Apart from merchant vessels, regular passenger ferry lines are also used to transport different goods from those northern African territories to mainland Spain. As the control of passengers is very strong both in the port of departure and on arrival, migrants hide in containers, trailers, lorry axes and below false bottoms of vehicles. According to the Western Balkan Risk Analysis Network, detections of clandestine entries in the region are on the increase. Most detections were of Afghans and Pakistanis detected in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia hidden in or under vehicles heading from Greece, usually without the driver knowing.

#### **Overstaying the legal length of stay**

Overstaying the length of the visa period is probably a common *modus operandi* for migrants illegally staying in the EU. It is very difficult to establish at the border, because migrants have genuine travel documents. According to the Schengen Borders Code, border guards can nevertheless refuse entry on nine grounds, two of them related to overstaying. The first reason is the lack of appropriate documentation justifying



the purpose of stay that is used to prevent overstaying, the second is for having already stayed for more than three months within a six-month period. Together, these two reasons for refusals totalled approximately 31 700 cases in 2011 and accounted for 27% of all refusals reported by Member States.

### Forged travel documents

All Member States that responded to a survey in the framework of a Frontex risk analysis project in 2011 considered document fraud to be a high-priority issue. Document fraud is widely accepted to be important for several reasons. First, this type of fraud allows migrants in an irregular or unlawful situation to enter the territory of a Member State, and to move freely within the EU. Secondly, assuming a false identity and operating within black markets seriously undermines international criminal investigations and national social systems and the ability of any state to effectively manage and protect its legitimate communities. Finally, document fraud progressively demands closer and stronger links to organised crime because modern documents require more skilled and expensive techniques to produce quality forgeries, and because the emerging trend of impersonation has created an illegal market place for large volumes of stolen or complicity supplied documents.

According to the FRAN data, between 2010 and 2011 there was just a 1.4% increase in the number of individuals detected using false (forged or counterfeit) documents to enter the EU; this is a steady trend despite reports of a widespread shift away from false documents towards genuine document abuse, which includes impersonation, fraudulently obtained documents and abuse of legal channels. Hence, in the presence of a shift towards genuine document abuse, detections of false-document




Figure 11: **Analysis of document fraud at EU level suggests a trend away from the use of passports towards less sophisticated documents such as ID cards and residence permits**

users increasingly underestimate the overall trend of document fraud. Nearly half of all detections of false-document users were of nationals from just five countries – Ukraine, Albania, Morocco, Iran and Nigeria; of the remaining nationalities, around 150 were detected at very low frequencies.

Consistent with previous years around three-quarters of all detections on entry were at the external air border. Moreover, detections at the air border increased relative to decreases at the land and sea borders, which is the reversal of previous trends. For example, the ARA 2011 showed that detections of false document users had increased proportionately more at the land and sea borders and the Tailored Risk Assessment on False Documents 2011 showed a strong trend away from the use of passports towards less sophisticated documents such as ID cards and residence permits (see Fig. 11). Hence, the FRAN data for 2011 may suggest a reversal of this trend, as passports are by far the most common document used at the air border.

As is typically the case with document fraud, in 2011 Member States experienced pressure from an extensive range of forgery



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techniques applied to many types of documents and used by a very wide assortment of nationalities. Such a broad landscape of document fraud inevitably renders profiling and effective control extremely challenging, and confirms the utility of developing systematic analyses, alerts and operational support at the EU level.

Furthermore, the abuse of authentic documents clearly illustrates the dynamically changing landscape of document fraud, and confirms the importance of developing and updating traditional approaches to document fraud that have, to date, tended to limit their focus to false documents (forged and counterfeit). Document fraud is also manifestly an international phenomenon; therefore systematic approaches to document fraud should be conducted at a higher than national level, with a particular emphasis on improving profiling and identifying, and quickly disseminating information on emerging *modi operandi*.

These needs are currently being addressed by the European Union Document-Fraud (EDF) Project at Frontex, which aims to significantly develop and maintain the situational picture of document fraud to cross borders of the EU and Schengen Area. This ambitious project has formed a risk analysis community specialising in document fraud, and aims to standardise terms, definitions and reporting protocols at the EU level in order to implement data collection and effective analysis of all cases of document fraud detected at the external borders, including the abuse of genuine documents.

### **Authentic documents obtained with false supporting documentation**

Fraudulent supporting documents in support of visa applications or resident permits were being widely reported. There is a degree of organised criminality associated with document provision but intelligence on criminal networks behind this type of fraud are difficult to obtain because it often involved forgeries made in third countries. Those associated with this abuse are able to adapt rapidly.

Sham marriages are used to obtain permission to live within the EU and were mentioned with increasing frequency in the media. This suggests that this *modus operandi* may be on the rise, particularly involving females from the new 2004 EU Member States and males from Africa and Asia.

### **3.3. Other illegal activities**

Frontex mandate is related to irregular migration; however, border guards in cooperation with customs officers and the police are also engaged in combating other criminal activities at the border such as smuggling of goods and THB. This section is an overview of cross-border crimes affecting the work of border guards at the external borders of the EU identified during Frontex operations and in Member States reports in 2011. The analysis is structured around the following issues: (1) drugs, (2) smuggling of excise goods (cigarettes and oil products), (3) stolen vehicles (on exit), and (4) THB. The text aims to provide an over-



view of the points of entry, routes of trafficking and the *modus operandi*.

### 3.3.1. Drugs

Routes of drug trafficking vary depending on the kind of drugs, its origin and the criminal organisation involved. During Frontex Joint Operations, similarly to the year before, drug seizures were reported mainly on the Western Balkan route, Eastern Mediterranean route and Western Mediterranean route. In addition, Member States continue to report significant smuggling of drugs via individual couriers on flights originating from South America and the Caribbean.

The main points of entry for heroin into the EU remain on the Eastern Mediterranean route, at the external borders with Turkey. The illicit drug is transported along a route that is similar to the route used for smuggling migrants, i.e. leading from Afghanistan through Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. During the permanent Frontex JO Focal Points Land 2011, heroin was detected at the Bulgarian border with Turkey (BCP Kaptian Andreevo) concealed in personal bags, baby nappies, slicked to the body, but also hidden in private cars. Drug trafficking in lorries seems to be on the decline, as there were no detections at BCP Kapitan Andreevo in 2011. This trend is confirmed by the criminal analysis of the Turkish police showing that most cases of heroin detection in 2010 involved smuggling in private cars rather than on buses or in lorries. This is an indication that criminal organisations have opted for transport of illicit drugs in small quantities and consequently, rely rather on smaller than larger vehicles.

The Western Balkan route is also often used as a transit region for drugs held by Western Balkan criminal groups. According to Frontex JO Focal Points Land 2011 (JO FP

Land 2011), the main illicit drugs detected were heroin and cannabis, mostly smuggled by Albanians *en route* to Western Europe. A classic *modus operandi* of Albanian drug smugglers is the concealment of drugs in hidden compartments, like double-walled lorries and double-bottomed containers. Most of the drugs smuggled through the Western Balkans are destined for western European Member States, i.e. the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the UK.

By contrast, there was no report of heroin smuggling during Frontex Joint Operations on the 'silk road' crossing the EU eastern land borders.

The Western Mediterranean route is mostly used for trafficking of hashish from Morocco and cocaine from South America after transit through western and northern Africa. During the 45 operational days of Frontex JO Minerva in 2011 in the Western Mediterranean area, about six tonnes of hashish was seized. This corresponded to a significant increase in daily detections of illicit drugs compared to 2010 (+33% in the number of detections and +117% in the quantity seized). Based on the interviews of the smugglers, the drug was destined to a large number of different Member States, an indication of the level of organisation and the presence in several Member States of criminal groups active in drug smuggling at the EU external border. By order of frequency, the final destinations mentioned during the interviews of the smugglers were: Spain, France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Germany. During Frontex JO Indalo on the Spanish Costa de Levante, 12 tonnes of hashish was also seized. Drug smugglers use classic *modi operandi* ranging from concealment in vehicle, swallowing drugs for smuggling through BCP to using drug-filled inflatable boats and fishing boats to cross the blue borders.



Figure 12: In June 2011 within 'Operation Saffron' Spanish Guardia Civil intercepted two aircraft carrying 700 kg of hashish

© Guardia Civil 2011

The use of small aircraft (see Fig. 12) for cocaine and hashish trafficking to the Iberian Peninsula was reported on the increase in 2011. According to JO Indalo reports and open sources, about ten light aircraft were detected smuggling drugs from Morocco to the Spanish coast in 2011. On June 16, as part of 'Operation Saffron,' the Spanish authorities detected two light aircraft flying illicitly from Morocco. The planes were searched, four men were arrested and 700 kg of hashish seized. This *modus operandi* imitates the method used by criminal groups in South and Central America and might be an indication of these groups exporting their knowledge and gaining ground in the EU.

Cocaine smugglers' *modus operandi* remains the same and is mostly based on trafficking through maritime and air borders. According to UNODC individual drug couriers travelling from South America or West Africa are continuously smuggling cocaine hidden in luggage, stuck to body, hidden in body cavities and swallowed (the so-called 'drug mules'). In 2011 reintroduction of trafficking liquid cocaine by drug couriers was also reported. Cocaine in solution was predominantly seized at airports and seaports.

At the sea borders it is smuggled on tourist boats, cargo freighters, container ships but its was also reported that aircraft are used to drop cocaine bundles to international waters was reported. According to UNODC in 2011 there was some evidence

that drug cartels from West Africa were making use of submarines to facilitate their trade. These 'narco-submarines' can carry relatively large quantities of drugs and are very hard to detect.

Some synthetic drugs were seized at the external borders, yet in insignificant quantities, which might result from the fact that domestic production in Europe satisfied the drug market demand. In fact, recent seizures of synthetic drugs were mostly made on passengers on exit. This may be linked to the new trend of 'narco-tourism', particularly practiced by Brazilians. Young, educated, middle-class Brazilians are contacted by drug traffickers offering them trips to the EU with all the expenses paid. In return, young people carry drugs (mostly ecstasy and LSD) on the way back to Brazil, where they are further compensated for the job. Belgium and the Netherlands are the most common destination countries in the EU for 'narco-tourism'. When leaving Europe, the drug carriers may transit through different EU airports, Lisbon being a major transit point. In Brazil, the target airports are secondary hubs, such as the airports in Belo Horizonte, Salvador and Recife, where direct flights to Portugal, Spain, France and Germany are available.



### 3.3.2. Smuggling of excise goods

#### Smuggling of tobacco

The smuggling of excise goods is a diverse phenomenon related to the customs regulations in place in both the bordering countries and the price gaps existing between particular goods. The most common excise goods smuggled across the external border of the EU are cigarettes and petroleum products.

Cigarette smuggling significantly affects the work of border authorities on the eastern land border and the land borders with Western Balkan countries (see Fig. 13). It is also increasingly reported at the sea and air borders. Cigarette smuggling is perceived by organised crime groups (OCG) as a 'low risk – high profit' enterprise, especially if compared to drug trafficking which, though highly lucrative, carries with it hefty penalties. Main destination countries for smuggled cigarettes are Western European countries such as the UK, Ireland, France, Belgium, Germany, Scandinavian countries and those located along the eastern border of the EU. These eastern countries are also used as transit countries, as cigarettes are frequently transported within Eastern European immigrant networks from their home countries to above mentioned Western European destination countries. In the case of cigarettes smuggled across sea borders, the main destination countries are Cyprus, Greece, Italy and the UK.

According to Frontex JO Focal Points Land 2011 detections of cigarette smuggling at eastern borders in 2011 were 50% lower than in 2010. However, this does not include cigarette seizures made by law-enforcement authorities near the external border. For instance in September, the Polish authorities reported the detection



© Polish Border Guard 2011

Figure 13: **In Poland, border-control authorities and customs mobile teams participated in operations targeting cigarette smugglers at Polish-Belarusian border**

of 3 700 cartons of cigarettes in transit from Lithuania.

The *modi operandi* of cigarette smugglers are diverse. They range from 'ant' smuggling carried out by individuals to large scale enterprises which involve the use of cars, buses, lorries, trains, and even aeroplanes. Incidents of cigarette smuggling involving diplomatic personnel were reported. Smugglers were also reported using off-road vehicles and tractors as well as small boats along the River Nemunas or the River Bug, the border rivers in Belorussia and Ukraine, respectively.

There were also several reports in 2011 of migrants being smuggled together with cigarettes on the Eastern Mediterranean land route. In March 2011, two Pakistani migrants claimed to have been transported 1 300 km from the Iranian-Turkish border to Istanbul in a lorry carrying approximately 30 other migrants and a considerable amount of cigarettes hidden in a concealed compartment. Some months later, in October 2011, another Pakistani migrant claimed to have been transported hidden in a lorry full of cig-



arettes. According to the Turkish media, a Turkish registered lorry was stopped by the police *en route* from Dogubeyazit (near the Iranian border) to Istanbul. In the lorry, the police found not only 53 migrants (Pakistanis and Afghans) but also approximately 2.5 million illegal cigarettes in a hidden compartment. These cases indicate the length of the journey that clandestine migrants are prepared to undertake, presumably in very cramped conditions. Moreover, they also show that either two different criminal networks are cooperating to use the same transportation logistics in Turkey, or a single facilitation network is dealing with both the smuggling of cigarettes and the facilitation of migrants.

During JO Poseidon 2011 seizures of cigarettes at sea borders were also reported. Smugglers used cargo vessels heading from Ukraine and Moldova to Cyprus, Greece and Italy. In three incidents, 276 000 cartons of cigarettes were detected.

#### Trafficking of petroleum products

Trafficking of oil products is mainly reported at the eastern European borders with the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Ukraine, as well as with Balkan states (e.g. Serbia). This kind of smuggling is motivated by the price difference between EU Member States and their immediate third-country neighbours. In most cases smugglers used illegally reconstructed petrol tanks with significantly enlarged capacity, as well as buses and off-road vehicles to transport large barrels and fuel containers.

Though gasoline smuggling is commonly believed to have only a limited and local impact on the EU economy, fuel smugglers present a challenge to the management of the movement at borders. Firstly, this is because the queues created by them

increase the waiting time at border-crossing points. Secondly, modifications to vehicles to increase their fuel capacity, e.g. expanded fuel tanks, add to the security risks. Though uncommon, incidents of exploding vehicles carrying smuggled fuel are not unheard of and the threat is increased when the price gap creates a higher demand, this in turn intensifying the smuggling pressure.

#### 3.3.3. Stolen vehicles

Stolen vehicles are obviously mainly identified in connection to the control at land borders and, to a lesser extent, sea borders. In recent years, stolen vehicles detected on the eastern land border and the land border with the Western Balkans had been mostly stolen in Belgium, Germany, France and Italy. Intelligence received from Member States points to an increase in trafficking of stolen vehicles leaving the EU at the external border between Bulgaria and Turkey.

The most common *modus operandi* is the transit of vehicles with falsified documents, smuggling cars dismantled into spare parts (see Fig. 14), transportation of vehicles on a platform trailer or train, trafficking of



Figure 14: **Smuggling of dismantled stolen motorbikes detected at the Hungarian border with Ukraine in the area of Zahony BCP**



leased cars, and altering vehicle identification numbers (VIN number). The latter *modus operandi*, however, has been reported on the decrease.

Given the sophistication of the *modi operandi*, the detection of stolen vehicles is very time consuming. It relies mostly on the profiling of drivers, hence the collaboration of law-enforcement authorities active within the territories and border-control authorities is of crucial importance here.

In 2011, stolen heavy vehicles, machines, buses and trailers have been reported on the increase, particularly those from the UK, France, Germany or Spain. The detected vehicles were mostly being transported to Belarus and Ukraine.

Frontex JO Minerva 2011 at the Spanish sea borders provided additional evidence for stolen vehicles being smuggled to Morocco. As many as 34 stolen vehicles were detected during the Joint Operation. In comparison to 2010, the daily detection average increased sevenfold in 2011. Most cases involved luxury cars (such as BMW, Porsche Cayenne and Audi). Their theft was mainly reported in France, Italy and Spain, and, less commonly, in Belgium and the Netherlands. The drivers were mainly Moroccan and, to a lesser extent, European nationals (from Italy, France, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and Belgium).

### 3.3.4. Trafficking in human beings

Trafficking in human beings (THB) is probably one of the most profitable cross-border crimes and it is often associated with other criminal activities. However, it is not easily detected at the borders, because at that moment of the trafficking process, the victims themselves are either unaware of their fate or afraid to collaborate with law-enforcement authorities. Never-

theless, this criminal activity is closely related to the movement of people, including movement across borders, and thus border-control authorities can be instrumental in preventing it. While many victims come from Member States themselves, this analysis focuses on victims from third countries, as they are more likely to have crossed the external border at some point of the trafficking process.

According to information received from Member States, the top nationalities detected as victims of human trafficking in the EU still include Brazilians, Chinese, Nigerians, Ukrainians and Vietnamese. In addition, victims from other third countries like Albania, Ghana, Morocco, Moldova, Egypt, Indian, the Philippines and the Dominican Republic have also been reported, illustrating the broad geographical distribution of the places of origin of victims. Most THB cases are related to illegal work and sexual exploitation in Europe.

In some cases, the distinction between the smuggling of migrants and THB is not easily established because some of the migrants are initially using the services of smugglers, but it is only later, once in the EU, that they may fall victim to THB. According to intelligence from JO Hermes, this is particularly the case for women embarking for illegal border-crossing from North Africa to the EU. Once in Europe, some of them are intimidated by their smugglers and forced into prostitution.

A worrying trend reported during JO Indalo is the increasing number of detections of illegal border-crossing by minors and pregnant women (see Fig. 15), as criminal groups are taking advantage of an immigration law preventing their return. Although it is not clear whether these cases are related to THB, women and children are among the most vulnerable. Most of these

women claimed to be from Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon and were between the fifth and ninth month of pregnancy. Minors were identified as being from Nigeria, Algeria and Congo.

Another *modus operandi* is for the criminal groups to convince their victim to apply for international protection. Such *modus operandi* was illustrated by the verdict of a Dutch court case in July 2011, when one suspect was convicted for trafficking of Nigerian female minors. The asylum procedure in the Netherlands was misused by the criminal organisation to get an accommodation for the victims. The victims were forced to sexual exploitation in several Member States.



Figure 15: **Spanish border guards rescuing a baby from a boat that departed from North Africa**



## 4. Economic and legal developments

### 4.1. Economic factors

#### Euro-area economic crisis continues

Europe's economic crisis has entered its third year in 2012. The deterioration of the economic situation in the EU has been widely associated with a substantially worsened development in financial markets, including sovereign debt concerns and banking sector issues, and a weaker-than-expected global recovery.

The European Commission (EC) expects\* that almost all Member States will experience a slowdown of economic growth or even periods of contraction during 2012, while in 2013 a modest recovery is likely. Substantial differences will persist across Member States also in terms of job creation and unemployment rates. For example, among the largest economies Spain recorded the highest increase in unemployment rates in 2011 (up to 21.2% from 20.4%) whereas Germany reported almost 1% drop in its unemployment rate (to roughly 6.0%). Poland, Belgium and Austria have also come out of the downturn with lower unemployment rates (see Fig. 16).

The EC's autumn 2011 forecast suggests that the unemployment rate will increase in nearly half of Member States during 2012. Unemployment rates are expected to vary between about 4% in Austria and more than 20% in Spain. These differences in labour demand will continue to impact destination choices of labour migrants coming to the EU during 2012 and 2013.

#### Austerity measures in Member States

Austerity measures, designed to reduce budget deficits, improve investor confidence or obtain new credit lines have been introduced throughout Member States in various forms already from 2009 onwards. The most obvious examples of such measures include Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the Baltic countries.

Importantly, austerity measures have intensified somewhat during 2011. For example, in Bulgaria the plan included reducing public spending by \$584 million by cutting funds to almost all government ministries. In addition, a reduction of public sector jobs by 10% and a freezing wages for up to three years was part of the same package.

In the case of the UK, the government unveiled the country's steepest public spending cuts in more than 60 years. According to the plan, roughly EUR 83 billion in spending cuts should be achieved by 2015, bringing the 11% of GDP budget deficit down to 1% over the next three years.

The Hungarian government's plans include a 15% cut in public sector expenditure (saving EUR 171 million), a lower wage ceiling for public sector employees and the elimination of the 13th month payment. In Lithuania, the austerity measures encompass a two year freeze in public sector salaries, a 30% decrease in public spending and a 11% cut of public-sector pensions.

In conclusion, given the unfavourable economic climate in the EU, austerity measures

\* European Economic Forecast – Autumn 2011




Figure 16: Labour market development in the EU Member States, change in unemployment rates between 2005 and 2011

will become a more permanent feature in all Member States.

#### 4.2. Legal factors

##### Visa Information System rolled-out in North Africa

Following several years of delays, the Visa Information System (VIS) started operating in North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) during October 2011.

The new system is designed to process biometric data (photo and all ten fingerprints) and decisions related to all applications for short-stay or transit Schengen visas (see Fig. 17). According to the EC, when fully operational, Visa Information System will deliver faster border checks, more accurate visa procedures, better protection of travellers against identity-theft and more security.

In terms of the immediate impact on border checks in Member States, border-control authorities (only those selected) are



now obliged to systematically check the visa sticker number in the VIS. Matching the fingerprints of the visa holder with the visa sticker number will only become obligatory after a transitional period of three years. This obligation will not apply for a limited set of extraordinary circumstances (e.g. intense regular passenger flow and the need to facilitate bona fide travellers).

The North Africa region should be followed by the Near East (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), and the Gulf regions (Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen). All Schengen States' consular posts worldwide should be connected to the Visa Information System within two years.

#### Visa liberalisation process continues

The case of the Western Balkans clearly showed that visa liberalisation can produce significant negative consequences with



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Figure 17: **When a person applies for a visa his or her fingerprints are recorded in order to confirm the visa holder's identity and streamline checks**

fairly small minority groups having a disproportionate impact. Unfounded asylum applications from particular marginalised groups in Serbia and to a lesser extent also in other Western Balkan countries have significantly increased after the new legal travel channel became available.

Importantly, the specific case of the Western Balkans did not halt visa liberalisation proc-

### Visa Information System – the technical background

Visa Information System consists of three main building blocks: a central database, a national interface in each Schengen state, and a communication infrastructure between the central database and the national interfaces. This system architecture enables competent authorities of the Schengen States to process data on visa applications and on all visas that are issued, annulled, refused, revoked or extended.

The Visa Information System central database has alphanumerical searching capabilities for checking the veracity of a given visa sticker number aided by a system (AFIS) that compares new fingerprints against those in the database and returns hit/no hit responses, along with matches.

Currently, the central database is located in France (Strasbourg) and a back-up, capable of ensuring all functionalities is located in Austria (Sankt Johann im Pongau). By the end of 2012, the Agency for the management of large-scale IT systems in the area of justice, freedom and security will become the Managing Authority of VIS.

### **Unfounded asylum applications from the Western Balkans continued at lower levels in 2011**

In 2011 the overall number of asylum applications made by nationals from the five visa-exempt Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro) in all the Member States decreased by roughly one quarter compared to 2010. Nevertheless, the numbers still remained relatively high at slightly more than 9% of all asylum applications submitted in the EU (down from a 14% share recorded in 2010).

Despite more than a 30% decrease compared to 2010, Serbian nationals continued to be the single largest visa-exempt nationality claiming asylum in the EU during 2011. Serbs remained the second-ranked nationality (after Afghans) of asylum applicants in the EU.

esses with other EU partner countries. In fact, structured visa dialogues with Ukraine and Moldova that started at the end of 2009 and middle of 2010 respectively, have been proceeding as originally planned. The Council invited the European Commission (EC) to draft Action Plans setting out all the conditions to be met by Ukraine and Moldova before the possible establishment of a visa-free travel regime and to report regularly on the plans' implementation. The EC will present its assessment of wider security and migratory impacts of possible visa liberalisation for the two countries later in 2012 (April). The EC's positive assessment is a precondition for the start of the second phase of both visa liberalisation Action Plans.

#### **Visa safeguard clause as a new policy tool to counter possible abuse of visa liberalisation**

The European Commission's proposal for an amendment of Regulation 539/2001 continues to be discussed in co-decision procedure. The proposal has evolved somewhat since it was introduced in May 2011. However, the temporary suspension of the visa waiver for a third country whose nationals are exempted from the visa ob-

ligation is still the main point of the mentioned proposal. According to the EC, the updated regulation will come into force during 2012.

A Member State will thus have the opportunity to notify the EC if it is confronted with one or more of the following circumstances leading to an emergency situation due to substantial and sudden increase of:

- (a) Illegal stay over a six month period compared to the same period prior to visa liberalisation
- (b) Asylum applications which are manifestly unfounded or which do not fulfil the conditions for international protection
- (c) Rejected readmission applications submitted by a Member State to a visa-free third country in question.

Such a mechanism should only be a measure of last resort and can be applied to any third country exempted from the visa obligation. Importantly, a request by Member State will not automatically lead to the re-imposition of the visa obligation for the citizens of the third country concerned. The EC will consider a number of



elements in its assessment, including reporting from Frontex. In any case, the EC will have to submit its proposal within three months after receiving a request to

re-impose visa obligation, however, the temporary suspension of the visa waiver will only be possible for periods of up to six months.



## 5. Conclusions

The following risks at the external borders of the EU were identified according to the results of an annual risk analysis process involving Member State analysts participating in the Frontex Risk Analysis Network. They represent the main risks identified by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit after an Annual Analytical Review with Member State analysts.

The risks are described with the objective to inform decision makers in the Frontex Management Board when preparing the Programme of Work for 2013 and other high level planning and strategic decision processes. Thus, they are primarily aimed for strategic and planning purposes, and require specific tailored analysis for tactical and operational decisions.

Risks are presented with reference to their components of threat, vulnerability and impact. Threats are described as the forces or pressure acting from the outside on the external borders. Vulnerabilities are understood as the factors at a specific border section or type or within the EU that might increase or decrease the magnitude or likelihood of the threat. Impacts are defined as the effects on the internal security and the security of the external border. Widely applicable impacts, such as infringements of the Schengen Borders Code or breaches of domestic immigration laws, are not repeated.

### **1. Risk of large and sustained numbers of illegal border-crossing at the external land and sea border with Turkey**

The border between Greece and Turkey is very likely to remain in 2013 among the main areas of detections of illegal border cross-

ing along the external border, at levels similar to those reported between 2008 and 2011, i.e. between 40 000 and 57 000 detections per annum.

This area of the external border neighbours Turkey and offers a natural transit bridge with Asia, which includes many source countries for migrants hoping to illegally cross the border to the EU. This situation is largely exploited by facilitators, in particular at the land border between Turkey and Greece. The challenge is ever increasing, as criminal groups continue to develop their networks and practices across the Greek-Turkish borders.

The majority of migrants are expected to come from Asian countries particularly Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, pushed by poor living conditions at home and pulled by the presence of a large number of fellow citizens already in the EU, relatively low return risk at this particular border section compared other border sections like air borders, rumours spreading among migrants about benefits available in EU Member States and long-term established perceptions about apparent easiness to cross illegally to the EU and which feedbacks from recent successes.

Depending on the political situation, migrants from the Middle East may increasingly join the flow. In addition, migrants from northern and western Africa, willing to illegally cross the EU external borders, are expected to increasingly take advantage of the Turkish visa policies, granting visas to a different set of nationalities than the EU, and the expansion of Turkish Airlines, to transit through the Turkish air borders to subsequently attempt to enter the EU illegally, either by air or through the neighbouring land



or sea borders. As a result, border-control authorities will increasingly be confronted with a wider variety of nationalities, and probably also a greater diversity of facilitation networks, further complicating the tasks of law-enforcement authorities.

This risk is interlinked with the risk of criminal groups facilitating secondary movements and the risk of border-control authorities faced with large flows of people in search of international protection.

## **2. Risk of document fraud to circumvent border-control measures**

The use of biometric travel documents renders document fraud increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, facilitators are developing new techniques to circumvent biometric checks, such as the use of supporting documents to fraudulently obtain authentic travel documents, or impostor techniques.

Consistent with the distribution of regular passengers among border types (land, air and sea), this risk is mostly associated with passenger entries at the external air borders, and to a lesser extent at the land borders.

Fraud is expected mostly among EU travel documents (e.g. passports, visas and ID cards) and there are indications of a shift away from the use of passports towards less sophisticated documents such as ID cards and residence permits.

Member States experience pressure from an extensive range of forgery techniques applied to many types of documents and used by a very wide assortment of nationalities. Such a broad landscape of document fraud inevitably renders profiling and effective control extremely challenging, and confirms the utility of developing systematic analyses, alerts and operational support at the EU level.

Document fraud allows migrants to illegally enter the territory of a Member State, and then to move freely within the EU. In addition, assuming a false identity and operating within black markets seriously undermines international criminal investigations as well as national social systems and the ability of any state to effectively manage and protect its legitimate communities. Document fraud progressively demands closer and stronger links to organised crime because modern documents require more skilled and expensive techniques to produce quality forgeries, and because the emerging trend of impersonation has created an illegal market place for large volumes of stolen or complicity supplied documents.

## **3. Risk of renewed large numbers of illegal border-crossing at the southern maritime border**

The likelihood of large numbers of illegal border-crossing in the southern maritime border remains very high, either in the form of sporadic episodes similar to those reported in 2011 or in sustained flows on specific routes originating from Africa.

Irregular-migration flows at the southern maritime borders are expected to be concentrated within one of the three known routes, i.e. the Central Mediterranean route, the Western Mediterranean route or the Western African route. Larger flows are more likely to develop on the Central Mediterranean route than on the other two routes, because of its proximity to Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, where political instability and high unemployment rate among young people is pushing people away from their countries and where there is evidence for well-organised facilitation networks.

On the Western Mediterranean route, the situation remains of concern because of the increasing trend of illegal border-cross-



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ing reported throughout 2011. According to reported detections, the situation on the Western African route has been mostly under control since 2008 but remains critically dependant of the implementation of effective return agreements between Spain and western African countries. Should these agreements be jeopardised, irregular migration pushed by high unemployment and poverty is likely to resume quickly despite increased surveillance.

The composition of the flow is dependent on the route and the countries of departure, but includes a large majority of western and North Africans. Mostly economically driven, irregular migration on these routes is also increasingly dependent on the humanitarian crisis in western and northern African countries. Facilitators are increasingly recruiting their candidates for illegal border-crossing from the group that are most vulnerable to THB, i.e. women and children, causing increasing challenges for border control authorities.

#### **4. Risk of border-control authorities faced with large numbers of people in search of international protection**

Given the currently volatile and unstable security situation in the vicinity of the EU, there is an increasing risk of political and humanitarian crises in third countries resulting in large numbers of people in search of international protection being displaced to the land and sea borders of the EU. The most likely pressures are linked to the situation in North Africa and the Middle East. In addition, the situation in western African

countries like Nigeria may also trigger flows of people in search of international protection at the external borders.

In addition, facilitators of illegal border-crossing often recommend migrants to apply for international protection if detected at the external borders, only to abscond from the asylum centres a few days later. This threat is predominantly linked with irregular transit migration through the Western Balkan route and possibly, more sporadically, also along the eastern land border. Facilitators are exploiting the period, often several months, required for assessing asylum applications, and the lack of common policy on international protection at the EU level is part of the *modus operandi* proposed in their packages to the migrants. Their illegal activities are also thriving because of the still insufficient coordination between border-control and other law-enforcement authorities with asylum authorities.

When applications for international protection are made in large numbers as part of a *modus operandi* to illegally enter the EU, it overloads border-control authorities, thus diluting resources for those genuinely requiring protection while at the same time diverting resources that would otherwise be used to carry out border controls.

#### **5. Risk of increased facilitation of secondary movements of illegal stayers in the EU**

The persistently large number of annual illegal border-crossings along the external borders, oscillating between 100 000 and



150 000 detections since EU totals have been available in 2008, has created a market for criminal organisations facilitating the movement of illegal stayers within the EU. There is an increasing risk that these secondary movements are adding to the pull factors for illegal border-crossing at the EU external borders.

Member States are increasingly reporting migrants who, after crossing the external border illegally, transit through Greece via the intra-Schengen air border using fraudulent documents. In support of this, the Europol Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA 2011) highlighted organised crime groups in Pakistan as key producers and suppliers of counterfeit identity documents and linked the supply with the current high levels of irregular migration to Greece, and the identification of laboratories producing counterfeit documents in Greece.

The facilitation of secondary movement of illegal stayers takes advantage of cheaper connections between small airports of EU Member States, as well as an increase in on-line check-in systems that reduce the possibility of detection of fraudulent documents.

At the land borders, the Western Balkan route remained largely a function of transiting flow of migrants that enter the EU at Greek-Turkish borders and later continue towards other Member States through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia. Detections of illegal border-crossing at the land borders with Western Balkan countries in Slovenia, Hungary and Romania, as well as detections of migrants between Greece and Italy, will remain dependent on the volume of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route.

The risk of facilitation of secondary movements is also linked to the risk of border-

control authorities being faced with the flow of people in search of international protection.

## **6. Risk of less effective border control due to changing operational environment**

At the horizon of 2013, the operational environments of border control are likely to be affected, on the one hand, by austerity measures reducing resources, and on the other hand, by increased passenger flows triggering more reliance on technological equipment.

Austerity measures have been introduced throughout Member States in various forms since 2009. The most obvious examples are found in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the Baltic countries. These measures could result in increasing disparities between Member States in their capacity to perform border controls and hence enabling facilitators to select border types and sections that are perceived as weaker in detecting specific *modi operandi*.

Budget cuts could also exacerbate the problem of corruption, increasing the vulnerability to illegal activities across the external borders.

Austerity measures will inevitably impact on the efficacy of border-control authorities in detecting and preventing a wide array of illegal activities at the borders, ranging from illegal border-crossing through smuggling of excise goods to THB.

Border-crossing points with large flows of passengers – mostly at the air border and along the eastern land borders – increasingly rely on technology to support the border controls. This clearly has advantages such as increasing detection rates of known cases of fraudulent entry, but the

decreasing importance of human interventions increases the risk of a new *modus operandi* to pass undetected and reduces the possibility to collect human intelligence.

As reported by Member States, it also increases the likelihood of criminal groups relying on classical techniques to target less-equipped border-crossing points such as small airports.

#### **7. Risk of abuse of new legal travel channels to enter and sub-sequent illegal stay in the EU**

The increase in the number of air and overland passengers, and rising global mobility will increase the number of border checks. Visa liberalisation and local border-traffic agreements are also being increasingly implemented or planned. As a result, the responsibilities and workloads of border-control authorities are also increasing.

The purpose of visa liberalisation is to facilitate people-to-people contacts, enhance business opportunities and cultural exchange, and to offer opportunities in the EU to the people of the given region/country. These objectives implicitly entail increases in passenger flows, translating into an increased workload for border-control authorities. In turn, this places additional stress on border-control authorities to prevent irregular migration especially in terms of preventing overstaying.

It also carries an increasing risk of document fraud, as migrants willing to enter the EU illegally seek to obtain fraudulent documents from the third countries benefiting from visa liberalisation.

In addition, the numbers of cases of asylum abuse by the five visa-exempt nationalities of the Western Balkans, mostly Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Mac-

edonia, even if showing signs of decreases compared to their peak in 2011, are likely to persist at a level higher than it was the case prior to visa liberalisation.

#### **8. Risk of border-control authorities increasingly confronted with cross-border crimes and travellers with the intent to commit crime or terrorism within the EU**

As a corollary to strengthened surveillance and checks along the external borders, border-control authorities will be increasingly confronted with the detection of cross-border crimes such as THB, drug trafficking and the smuggling of excise goods, as well as with detections of cross-border crime committed on exit, like the smuggling of stolen assets, in particular vehicles.

The Eastern Mediterranean route across the external borders with Turkey remains the main channel of entry of heroin into the EU. The Western Balkan route is also often used as a transit region for hashish and heroin held by Western Balkan criminal groups. There is an increasing risk of hashish and cocaine trafficking activity in the Western Mediterranean area, from Morocco to Spain, sometimes combined with the smuggling of migrants. These groups are operating with increasingly sophisticated means, such as the use of small aircraft.

Cigarette smuggling significantly affects the work of border authorities on the eastern land border and the land borders with Western Balkan countries. It is also increasingly reported at sea and air borders. The *modi operandi* range from 'ant' smuggling carried by individuals to large-sale enterprises. The detection of cigarette smuggling consumes time and resources of border control authorities.



Trafficking of oil products is mainly reported at the eastern European borders with the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as with Balkan states. Even though petrol smuggling is commonly believed to have only a limited and local impact on the EU economy, fuel smugglers present a challenge to the management of the movement of passengers at the borders.

Stolen vehicle identification is mainly linked to the control at land borders and, to a lesser extent, sea borders. Intelligence received from Member States also indicates an increase in trafficking of stolen vehicles leaving the EU at the external borders between Bulgaria and Turkey, and also an increase in stolen heavy vehicles, machines, buses and trailers detected at the external land borders with Belarus and Ukraine.

Given the sophistication of the *modus operandi*, the detection of stolen vehicles relies mostly on the profiling of drivers and expertise in vehicle identification technique, hence the collaboration between law-enforcement authorities operating in the territory and border-control authorities is extremely important.

THB is not easily detected at the borders. Nevertheless, this criminal activity is inescapably related to the movement of people, including movement across borders, and thus border-control authorities' efforts can prove instrumental in combating it. According to information received from Member States, Brazilians, Chinese, Nigerians, Ukrainians and Vietnamese remain among the nationalities most commonly detected as victims of human trafficking in the EU.

A worrying trend is the increasing detections of illegal border-crossing of minors and pregnant women, in particular along the Western Mediterranean route, as criminal groups are taking advantage of immigration legislation in Member States preventing the return of these two groups of migrants. Although it is not clear whether these cases are related to THB, women and children are clearly among the most vulnerable.

There is an intelligence gap on terrorist groups that are active in the EU and their connections with irregular-migration networks. The absence of strategic knowledge on this issue at the EU level may constitute a vulnerability for internal security. Knowledge gained at the external borders can be shared with other law enforcement authorities to contribute narrowing this gap.

## 6. Statistical annex

### LEGEND

**Symbols and abbreviations:** **n.a.** not applicable  
: data not available

**Source:** FRAN data as of 10 February 2012, unless otherwise indicated

**Note:** 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries



**Indicator 1A – Detections of illegal border-crossing between border-crossing points:**

The number of third-country nationals detected by Member State authorities when illegally entering or attempting to enter the territory **between border-crossing points (BCPs)** at external borders only. Detections during hot pursuits at the immediate vicinity of the border are included. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

**Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported by routes and top three nationalities at the external borders

<b>Routes</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>Share of total</b>	<b>% change on previous year</b>
<b>Central Mediterranean Route</b>	<b>11 043</b>	<b>4 450</b>	<b>64 261</b>	46	1 344
Tunisia	1 624	652	27 982		4 192
Nigeria	1 655	1	6 078		607 700
Not specified	1	0	5 436		n.a.
Central Africa	0	0	3 703		n.a.
<b>Eastern Mediterranean route</b>	<b>39 975</b>	<b>55 688</b>	<b>57 025</b>	40	2.4
<b>Land</b>	<b>11 127</b>	<b>49 513</b>	<b>55 558</b>		12
Afghanistan	639	21 389	19 308		-9.7
Pakistan	1 224	3 558	13 130		269
Bangladesh	292	1 496	3 541		137
<b>Sea</b>	<b>28 848</b>	<b>6 175</b>	<b>1 467</b>		-76
Afghanistan	11 758	1 373	310		-77
Pakistan	257	148	179		21
Morocco	87	107	149		39
<b>Western Mediterranean Route</b>	<b>6 642</b>	<b>5 003</b>	<b>8 448</b>	6	69
<b>Sea</b>	<b>5 003</b>	<b>3 436</b>	<b>5 103</b>		49
Algeria	3 190	1 242	1 037		-17
Morocco	254	300	775		158
Côte d'Ivoire	85	122	466		282
<b>Land</b>	<b>1 639</b>	<b>1 567</b>	<b>3 345</b>		113
Not specified	503	1 108	2 610		136
Algeria	464	459	735		60
Morocco	672	0	0		n.a.
<b>Circular route from Albania to Greece</b>	<b>40 250</b>	<b>35 297</b>	<b>5 269</b>	3.7	-85
Albania	38 017	32 451	5 022		-85
Serbia	48	39	46		18
Pakistan	21	68	44		-35
<b>Western Balkan Route</b>	<b>3 089</b>	<b>2 371</b>	<b>4 646</b>	3.3	96
Afghanistan	700	469	981		109
Serbia	1 683	687	833		21
Pakistan	10	39	606		1 454
<b>Eastern borders Route</b>	<b>1 335</b>	<b>1 043</b>	<b>990</b>	0.7	-5.1
Moldova	396	393	250		-36
Georgia	173	144	209		45
Somalia	64	48	120		150
<b>Western African Route</b>	<b>2 244</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>340</b>	0.2	73
Morocco	176	179	321		79
Senegal	186	2	4		100
Guinea	304	0	4		n.a.
<b>Other</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>		-67
<b>Total</b>	<b>104 599</b>	<b>104 051</b>	<b>140 980</b>		<b>35</b>



## Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

	2008	2009	2010	2011	Share of total	% change on previous year
<b>All Borders</b>						
Tunisia	7 648	1 701	1 498	28 829	20	1 824
Afghanistan	19 284	14 539	25 918	22 992	16	-11
Pakistan	3 157	1 592	3 878	15 377	11	297
Not specified	3 549	1 068	1 592	11 900	8.4	647
Nigeria	7 104	1 824	559	6 893	4.9	1 133
Algeria	4 032	4 487	8 763	6 156	4.4	-30
Albania	44 009	38 905	33 260	5 138	3.6	-85
Bangladesh	1 477	551	1 647	4 923	3.5	199
Morocco	8 932	1 710	1 959	3 780	2.7	93
Ghana	2 406	358	255	3 089	2.2	1 111
Others	58 283	37 864	24 722	31 903	23	29
<b>Total all borders</b>	<b>159 881</b>	<b>104 599</b>	<b>104 051</b>	<b>140 980</b>		<b>35</b>
<b>Land Border</b>						
Afghanistan	1 224	2 410	22 844	20 394	29	-11
Pakistan	2 640	1 328	3 675	13 783	20	275
Albania	41 195	38 088	32 592	5 076	7.3	-84
Algeria	570	676	6 961	4 670	6.7	-33
Bangladesh	1 078	305	1 506	3 575	5.1	137
Not specified	1 623	565	1 304	2 747	3.9	111
Morocco	5 343	737	1 319	2 236	3.2	70
Congo	1	12	103	1 777	2.5	1 625
Somalia	537	259	4 102	1 498	2.1	-63
Syria	2 888	389	530	1 254	1.8	137
Others	17 050	12 671	14 855	12 798	18	-14
<b>Total land borders</b>	<b>74 149</b>	<b>57 440</b>	<b>89 791</b>	<b>69 808</b>		<b>-22</b>
<b>Sea Border</b>						
Tunisia	7 602	1 643	711	28 013	39	3 840
Not specified	1 926	503	288	9 153	13	3 078
Nigeria	6 966	1 749	196	6 380	9.0	3 155
Ghana	2 406	351	207	2 734	3.8	1 221
Afghanistan	18 060	12 129	3 074	2 598	3.7	-15
Mali	2 334	723	23	2 484	3.5	10 700
Egypt	2 667	545	713	1 948	2.7	173
Côte d'Ivoire	1 809	500	142	1 734	2.4	1 121
Pakistan	517	264	203	1 594	2.2	685
Morocco	3 589	973	640	1 544	2.2	141
Others	37 856	27 779	8 063	12 990	18	61
<b>Total sea borders</b>	<b>85 732</b>	<b>47 159</b>	<b>14 260</b>	<b>71 172</b>		<b>399</b>

### Indicator 1B – Detections of illegal border-crossing at border-crossing points:

The number of third-country nationals detected by Member State authorities when entering clandestinely or attempting to enter illegally (such as hiding in transport means or in another physical way to avoid border checks at BCPs) the territory at **border-crossing points (BCPs)** at external borders only, whether they result in a refusal of entry or not. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

#### Clandestine entries at BCPs

Detections at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

	2009	2010	2011	Share of total	% change on previous year
<b>Border Type</b>					
Land	137	168	159	56	-5.4
Sea	159	74	123	44	66
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>					
Afghanistan	18	8	58	21	625
Algeria	30	35	55	20	57
Turkey	73	93	24	8.5	-74
Palestine	14	4	17	6.0	325
Morocco	20	14	15	5.3	7.1
Iraq	21	7	14	5.0	100
Pakistan	2	12	10	3.5	-17
India	8	1	10	3.5	900
Albania	3	7	9	3.2	29
Tunisia	5	0	8	2.8	n.a.
Others	102	61	62	22	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>282</b>		<b>17</b>

## Indicator 2 – Detections of facilitators:

The number of facilitators intercepted by Member State authorities who have intentionally assisted third-country nationals in the illegal entry to, or exit from, the territory across external borders. The indicator concerns detections of facilitators at the following locations: (1) at the external border (both at and between BCPs, for land air and sea) and (2) inside the territory and at internal borders between two Schengen Member States provided that the activities concerned the facilitation of third-country nationals for illegal entry or exit at external borders. This indicator should include third-country nationals as well as EU and/or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

### Facilitators

Detections for top ten nationalities\*

	2008	2009	2010	2011	Share of total	% change on previous year
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>						
Italy	580	875	1 367	568	8.2	-58
France	207	230	365	404	5.8	11
Morocco	503	475	413	390	5.6	-5.6
China	713	731	554	375	5.4	-32
Spain	259	286	285	320	4.6	12
Romania	134	292	398	268	3.9	-33
Not specified	892	322	261	255	3.7	-2.3
Pakistan	151	245	245	237	3.4	-3.3
Tunisia	101	114	121	229	3.3	89
Albania	641	670	430	221	3.2	-49
Others	5 703	4 931	4 190	3 690	53	-12
<b>Total</b>	<b>9 884</b>	<b>9 171</b>	<b>8 629</b>	<b>6 957</b>		<b>-19</b>

\* Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work.

### Indicator 3 – Detections of illegal stay:

The number of third-country nationals detected by Member State authorities while not fulfilling, or no longer fulfilling, the conditions for stay or residence in the Member State during the reference month, irrespective of whether they were detected inland or while trying to exit the territory. The category should include third-country nationals who are not in the possession of a valid visa, residence permit, travel document, etc. or in breach of a decision to leave the country. It also includes third-country nationals who initially entered legally but then overstayed their permission to stay. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

### Illegal stay

Detections for top ten nationalities

	2008	2009	2010	2011	Share of total	% change on previous year
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>						
Afghanistan	29 042	38 637	21 104	25 294	7.2	20
Tunisia	11 010	10 569	8 350	22 864	6.5	174
Morocco	30 521	25 816	22 183	21 887	6.2	-1.3
Algeria	13 359	12 286	14 261	15 398	4.4	8.0
Ukraine	9 100	10 021	8 835	12 844	3.7	45
Serbia	6 476	9 363	15 049	12 784	3.6	-15
Pakistan	7 848	9 058	10 508	12 621	3.6	20
Brazil	29 229	17 067	15 598	11 149	3.2	-29
Russia	5 876	9 526	9 471	10 314	2.9	8.9
Iraq	30 022	18 618	12 462	10 218	2.9	-18
Others	268 754	251 164	215 256	195 571	56	-9.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>441 237</b>	<b>412 125</b>	<b>353 077</b>	<b>350 944</b>		<b>-0.6</b>

#### Indicator 4 – Refusals of entry:

The number of third-country nationals refused entry at the external border. The indicator concerns only those third-country nationals who were refused entry by Member State authorities according to Article 13 of the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation (EC) No 562/2006) for not fulfilling all the entry conditions laid down in Article 5(1) while not belonging to the categories of persons referred to in Article 5(4), and to whom a standard refusal form has been issued in accordance with Annex V of the Schengen Borders Code. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

#### Refusals of entry by nationality

Refusals at the external borders by top ten nationalities

	2008	2009	2010	2011	Share of total	% change on previous year
<b>All Borders</b>						
Albania	971	1 672	2 324	15 947	14	586
Ukraine	15 394	18 964	18 744	15 809	13	-16
Russia	7 957	7 608	9 171	9 212	7.8	0.4
Serbia	3 274	3 946	6 999	7 206	6.1	3.0
Belarus	4 337	4 965	5 662	5 983	5.1	5.7
Brazil	11 121	8 062	6 178	4 777	4.0	-23
Morocco	4 627	3 300	2 349	4 168	3.5	77
Croatia	5 693	4 944	4 305	3 756	3.2	-13
Turkey	4 104	3 859	3 663	3 244	2.7	-11
ŸROM	1 177	2 084	4 080	3 211	2.7	-21
Others	62 639	53 625	45 176	44 774	38	-0.9
<b>Total all borders</b>	<b>121 294</b>	<b>113 029</b>	<b>108 651</b>	<b>118 087</b>		<b>8.7</b>



### Refusals of entry by nationality

Refusals at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

	2008	2009	2010	2011	Share of total	% change on previous year
<b>Land Border</b>						
Ukraine	14 473	17 963	17 658	14 697	25	-17
Albania	278	771	1 263	8 978	15	611
Russia	6 444	6 048	6 389	5 913	9.9	-7.5
Belarus	4 223	4 828	5 555	5 840	9.8	5.1
Serbia	2 781	3 386	5 720	5 776	9.7	1.0
Croatia	5 430	4 684	4 067	3 528	5.9	-13
Morocco	948	1 046	940	2 827	4.7	201
fYROM	1 086	1 926	3 307	2 648	4.4	-20
Georgia	119	5 841	3 098	2 571	4.3	-17
Turkey	2 300	1 885	1 754	1 779	3.0	1.4
Others	7 741	4 361	4 164	5 035	8.4	21
<b>Total land borders</b>	<b>45 823</b>	<b>52 739</b>	<b>53 915</b>	<b>59 592</b>		<b>11</b>
<b>Air Border</b>						
Brazil	10 926	7 956	6 072	4 697	9.5	-23
Albania	459	524	624	3 302	6.7	429
United States	2 650	2 834	2 338	2 219	4.5	-5.1
Nigeria	2 634	2 141	1 719	1 544	3.1	-10
Not specified	7 288	1 854	1 434	1 528	3.1	6.6
Russia	1 321	1 310	1 369	1 450	2.9	5.9
Venezuela	1 732	1 838	1 184	1 334	2.7	13
Paraguay	2 467	1 663	1 495	1 332	2.7	-11
Turkey	1 437	1 695	1 606	1 300	2.6	-19
Serbia	430	483	1 145	1 220	2.5	6.6
Others	35 547	33 308	30 377	29 467	60	-3.0
<b>Total air borders</b>	<b>66 891</b>	<b>55 606</b>	<b>49 363</b>	<b>49 393</b>		<b>0.1</b>
<b>Sea border</b>						
Albania	234	377	437	3 667	40	739
Russia	192	250	1 413	1 849	20	31
Philippines	648	403	589	739	8.1	25
Morocco	2 933	1 249	329	334	3.7	1.5
Serbia	61	77	134	210	2.3	57
Turkey	363	279	303	165	1.8	-46
Ukraine	217	144	194	155	1.7	-20
Not specified	432	131	82	150	1.6	83
Myanmar	54	44	83	140	1.5	69
India	1 261	223	227	135	1.5	-41
Others	2 161	1 507	1 582	1 558	17	-1.5
<b>Total sea borders</b>	<b>8 556</b>	<b>4 684</b>	<b>5 373</b>	<b>9 102</b>		<b>69</b>

## Reasons for refusals of entry

Reasons for refusals of entry at the external borders for top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	Not available	Total Reasons
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>												
Albania	15 947	95	49	339	61	2 088	163	2 262	10 355	166	528	<b>16 106</b>
Ukraine	15 809	93	176	4 827	82	7 038	898	1 346	1 110	57	209	<b>15 836</b>
Russia	9 212	1 314	22	5 626	219	686	83	750	408	303	146	<b>9 557</b>
Serbia	7 206	288	49	1 138	62	524	1 359	1 154	2 507	189	109	<b>7 379</b>
Belarus	5 983	86	2	2 478	43	408	185	2 351	225	187	29	<b>5 994</b>
Brazil	4 777	10	28	500	52	1 906	176	281	492	37	1 297	<b>4 779</b>
Morocco	4 168	1 783	147	450	96	352	18	150	988	205	45	<b>4 234</b>
Croatia	3 756	1 012	9	94	2	124	1 074	238	695	853	115	<b>4 216</b>
Turkey	3 244	189	104	1 974	59	464	45	148	178	75	115	<b>3 351</b>
ŷROM	3 211	34	10	240	35	546	713	497	1 113	52	15	<b>3 255</b>
Others	44 774	2 906	2 202	12 237	1 156	11 747	936	2 276	2 173	711	10 253	<b>46 597</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>118 087</b>	<b>7 810</b>	<b>2 798</b>	<b>29 903</b>	<b>1 867</b>	<b>25 883</b>	<b>5 650</b>	<b>11 453</b>	<b>20 244</b>	<b>2 835</b>	<b>12 861</b>	<b>121 304</b>

### Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- (A) has no valid travel document(s);
- (B) has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- (C) has no valid visa or residence permit;
- (D) has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- (E) has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- (F) has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- (G) does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- (H) is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- (I) is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union.



### Reasons for refusals of entry

Reasons for refusals of entry at the external borders by border type

	2009	2010	2011	Share of total	% change on previous year	Highest share
<b>All Borders</b>						
						<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	36 447	31 241	29 903	25	-4.3	Russia (19%)
E) No justification	29 736	25 987	25 883	21	-0.4	Ukraine (27%)
H) Alert issued	7 556	12 627	20 244	17	60	Albania (51%)
Reason not available	17 862	14 798	12 861	11	-13	United States (15%)
G) No subsistence	7 105	8 576	11 453	9.4	34	Belarus (21%)
A) No valid document	5 960	4 767	7 810	6.4	64	Morocco (23%)
F) Over 3 month stay	2 010	5 589	5 650	4.7	1.1	Serbia (24%)
I) Threat	2 329	2 561	2 835	2.3	11	Croatia (30%)
B) False document	3 099	2 908	2 798	2.3	-3.8	Unknown (15%)
D) False visa	1 599	1 715	1 867	1.5	8.9	Russia (12%)
<b>Total all borders</b>	<b>113 703</b>	<b>110 769</b>	<b>121 304</b>		<b>9.5</b>	
<b>Land Border</b>						
						<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	24 990	19 668	18 542	31	-5.7	Ukraine (24%)
H) Alert issued	5 167	8 901	13 769	23	55	Albania (48%)
E) No justification	12 240	11 523	9 383	16	-19	Ukraine (71%)
G) No subsistence	5 121	5 298	7 527	12	42	Belarus (31%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 149	4 633	4 745	7.8	2.4	Serbia (27%)
A) No valid document	1 962	1 747	3 515	5.8	101	Morocco (47%)
I) Threat	1 625	1 752	2 095	3.5	20	Croatia (41%)
D) False visa	326	410	555	0.9	35	Russia (23%)
B) False document	170	420	382	0.6	-9.0	Ukraine (43%)
Reason not available	54	3	1	0	-67	Moldova
<b>Total land borders</b>	<b>52 804</b>	<b>54 355</b>	<b>60 514</b>		<b>11</b>	
<b>Air Border</b>						
						<b>Nationality</b>
E) No justification	17 230	14 352	15 876	31	11	Brazil (12%)
Reason not available	17 050	14 127	12 362	24	-12	United States (15%)
C) No valid visa	10 268	8 854	9 172	18	3.6	Russia (9.2%)
G) No subsistence	1 933	3 190	3 479	6.7	9.1	Albania (13%)
H) Alert issued	2 002	2 973	3 353	6.5	13	Albania (32%)
A) No valid document	2 292	2 175	2 323	4.5	6.8	Unknown (24%)
B) False document	2 754	2 373	2 310	4.5	-2.7	Unknown (16%)
D) False visa	1 211	1 266	1 189	2.3	-6.1	Nigeria (6.2%)
F) Over 3 month stay	828	917	879	1.7	-4.1	Brazil (19%)
I) Threat	649	790	709	1.4	-10	Suriname (26%)
<b>Total air borders</b>	<b>56 217</b>	<b>51 017</b>	<b>51 652</b>		<b>1.2</b>	
<b>Sea Border</b>						
						<b>Nationality</b>
H) Alert issued	387	753	3 122	34	315	Albania (85%)
C) No valid visa	1 189	2 719	2 189	24	-19	Philippines (30%)
A) No valid document	1 706	845	1 972	22	133	Russia (59%)
E) No justification	266	112	624	6.8	457	Albania (83%)
Reason not available	758	668	498	5.4	-25	Afghanistan (12%)
G) No subsistence	51	88	447	4.9	408	Albania (87%)
D) False visa	62	39	123	1.3	215	Russia (31%)
B) False document	175	115	106	1.2	-7.8	Unknown (49%)
I) Threat	55	19	31	0.3	63	Albania (45%)
F) Over 3 month stay	33	39	26	0.3	-33	Russia (38%)
<b>Total sea borders</b>	<b>4 682</b>	<b>5 397</b>	<b>9 138</b>		<b>69</b>	



### Indicator 5 – Applications for international protection (asylum applications):

The number of third-country nationals having submitted an application for international protection or having been included in such an application (e.g. as a family member) during the reference month (see Article 4.1 of Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of 11 July 2007). Each applicant for international protection must be recorded only once within the same reference month. This indicator concerns applications submitted to Member State authorities at the external border as well as applications submitted inside the territory. It is the number of new applications which have been submitted exclusively during the reporting month (in contrast to the total number of applications under consideration in a country at a certain time). It should include all applications for international protection such as for refugee status, subsidiary or temporary protection, etc. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

#### Applications for international protection

Applications for international protection for top ten nationalities

	2008	2009	2010	2011	Share of total	% change on previous year
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>						
Afghanistan	13 600	24 699	21 552	29 672	12	38
Serbia	9 388	11 778	20 731	17 008	6.7	-18
Iraq	31 008	17 601	15 037	14 799	5.8	-1.6
Somalia	18 853	19 529	15 348	13 266	5.2	-14
Russia	16 987	15 063	13 059	12 936	5.1	-0.9
Pakistan	10 828	8 358	7 129	12 335	4.9	73
Nigeria	11 343	9 122	5 320	11 874	4.7	123
Iran	6 574	7 950	9 691	11 263	4.4	16
Eritrea	8 556	7 910	6 897	9 193	3.6	33
Not specified	22 049	8 906	6 906	8 962	3.5	30
Others	73 987	88 898	82 210	112 746	44	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>223 173</b>	<b>219 814</b>	<b>203 880</b>	<b>254 054</b>		<b>25</b>

**Indicator 6 – Persons using false travel documents for entering the territory illegally:**

The number of persons who were detected by Member State authorities during border checks at BCPs who attempted to use false travel documents, false visas or false permissions to stay for the purpose of entering the territory. All cases of falsifications (forged, counterfeit, substitution of photo or name, fantasy documents, etc.) have to be included. The category concerns only those persons who used false passports, identity cards, residence or work permits, visas, etc., i.e. types of documents of which genuine versions would be valid for entering. Cases in which other types of documents have been used, such as false driving licences, false boarding passes or false supporting documents should not be included in this category. This indicator should include third-country nationals as well as EU and Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

**Persons using false documents**

Detections on entry by border type and top ten nationalities and countries

	2009	2010	2011	Share of total	% change on previous year
<b>Border Type</b>					
Air	6 544	7 151	7 378	<i>n.a.</i>	3.2
Land	1 175	1 738	1 682	<i>n.a.</i>	-3.2
Sea	374	678	619	<i>n.a.</i>	-8.7
Not specified	1	0	3	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>					
Not specified	738	1 156	1 393	14	21
Ukraine	521	993	848	8.8	-15
Albania	246	227	784	8.1	245
Morocco	213	619	601	6.2	-2.9
Iran	298	400	451	4.7	13
Nigeria	581	463	366	3.8	-21
Congo (Dem. Rep.)	197	150	336	3.5	124
China	354	320	288	3.0	-10
Turkey	356	412	246	2.5	-40
Serbia	197	152	227	2.3	49
Others	4 393	4 675	4 142	43	-11
<b>Top Ten Countries of Issuance of Documents</b>					
Not specified	1 948	2 497	2 135	22	-14
Italy	429	477	924	9.5	94
Poland	309	690	630	6.5	-8.7
France	481	594	491	5.1	-17
Greece	169	413	440	4.5	6.5
Germany	211	354	290	3.0	-18
Belgium	271	203	288	3.0	42
Ukraine	201	273	245	2.5	-10
United Kingdom	188	190	237	2.4	25
Spain	190	174	232	2.4	33
Others	3 697	3 702	3 774	39	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>8 094</b>	<b>9 567</b>	<b>9 682</b>		<b>1.2</b>

### Indicator 7A – Administrative or judicial return decisions issued:

The number of third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the territory of the Member State (as well as the EU and the Schengen Member States Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) as a result of an administrative or judicial decision or act stating or declaring that the stay of the third-country national was illegal according to the provisions of the EC Return Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC) or – if applicable – a return decision/order issued in accordance with national law. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

#### Return decisions issued

Decisions issued for top ten nationalities\*

	2011	Share of total
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>		
Afghanistan	27 274	12
Pakistan	26 604	12
Algeria	12 336	5.3
Morocco	11 184	4.8
India	8 817	3.8
Ukraine	8 420	3.6
Albania	8 210	3.5
Bangladesh	7 895	3.4
Nigeria	7 357	3.2
Russia	7 016	3.0
Others	106 163	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>231 276</b>	

\* Data not available for France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.



### Indicator 7B – Third-country nationals effectively returned to third countries:

The number of third-country nationals returned from the territory of a Member State to a third country during the reporting month, either through voluntary departure or by forced return (removal). All cases included in this number have to be 1) either the consequence of an administrative or judicial decision or act stating or declaring that the stay of the third-country national was illegal and subject to an obligation to leave the territory of the Member State or 2) if a Member State makes use of the derogation provided for by Article 2(2) (b) of the Return Directive (e.g. the consequence of a return decision/order issued in accordance with national law). This indicator should not include EU nationals or third-country nationals returned to an EU Member State or a Schengen Associated Country (SAC).

#### Effective returns

People effectively returned to third countries for top ten nationalities

	2011	Share of total
<b>TOP TEN NATIONALITIES</b>		
Albania	12 699	8.5
Tunisia	8 623	5.8
Serbia	7 917	5.3
India	7 667	5.2
Morocco	6 905	4.6
Ukraine	6 467	4.3
Pakistan	6 253	4.2
Russia	6 149	4.1
Brazil	6 064	4.1
Nigeria	5 327	3.6
Others	74 782	50
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>148 853</b>	

#### Effective returns by type of return

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

	2011	Share of total
<b>TYPE OF RETURN</b>		
<b>Forced</b>	<b>80 809</b>	<b>54</b>
Enforced by Member State	69 979	87
Not specified	9 530	12
Enforced by Joint Operation	1 300	1.6
<b>Voluntary</b>	<b>56 975</b>	<b>38</b>
Others	32 140	56
IOM Assisted	13 908	24
Not specified	10 927	19
<b>Not specified</b>	<b>11 069</b>	<b>7.4</b>

#### TOP TEN NATIONALITIES

<b>Forced</b>		
Albania	12 232	8.2
Tunisia	7 279	4.9
Serbia	4 160	2.8
Pakistan	3 938	2.6
Afghanistan	3 180	2.1
Nigeria	3 112	2.1
India	2 866	1.9
Morocco	2 852	1.9
Egypt	2 307	1.5
China	2 200	1.5
Others	36 683	25

#### Voluntary

Russia	4 872	3.3
India	4 763	3.2
Ukraine	4 683	3.1
Serbia	3 742	2.5
Brazil	3 177	2.1
China	2 850	1.9
Pakistan	2 230	1.5
Iraq	2 205	1.5
Nigeria	1 956	1.3
Turkey	1 743	1.2
Others	24 754	17
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>148 853</b>	

## Notes on FRAN data sources and methods

The term Member States refers to FRAN Member States, which includes the 27 EU Member States and the three Schengen Associated Countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). For the data concerning detections at the external borders of the EU, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, detections at the Green Line demarcation with the area where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control have been assimilated into total detections at the EU external land border. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain, and in Greece these detections are included in the data for indicator 1A. Data for Norway only include detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehen-

sions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land Intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections on exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK. For Greece, only detections of illegal stayers with false documents are reported at the air border as detections of illegal stay on exit.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

For Ireland, data on persons using false documents are only available from February 2011 (FRAN Indicator 6). In Sweden, the data on false document use are not presented since the reported detections do not distinguish between apprehensions of persons using false documents at the external border and those apprehended inland.







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